Bottom up or rock bottom harmonization? : Francovich state liability in national courts by CONDON, Rónán et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LAW 2015/03 
Department of Law 
European Regulatory Private Law Project (ERC-ERPL-10)  
European Research Council (ERC) Grant 
Bottom up or Rock Bottom Harmonization? 
Francovich State Liability in National Courts 
Rónán Condon and Barend van Leeuwen (eds.) 
 
 
In cooperation with Mihalis Dekastros,  
Leticia Díez Sánchez, Federico della Negra,  
Przemyslaw Pałka, Maria Jose Schmidt-Kessen, 
Mira Turpeinen and Hubert de Verdelhan  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
European University Institute 
Department of Law 
“European Regulatory Private Law” Project 
European Research Council (ERC) Grant 
 
Bottom up or Rock Bottom Harmonization? 
Francovich State Liability in National Courts 
 
Rónán Condon and Barend van Leeuwen (eds.) 
In cooperation with Mihalis Dekastros, Leticia Díez Sánchez, 
Federico della Negra, Przemyslaw Pałka,  
Maria Jose Schmidt-Kessen, Mira Turpeinen  
and Hubert de Verdelhan 
 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2015/03 
ERC-ERPL-10 
 
 
  
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6739 
 
© 2015 Rónán Condon and Barend van Leeuwen 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
 
  
European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation (ERPL) 
 
A 60 month European Research Council grant has been awarded to Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz  
for the project “European Regulatory Private Law: the Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation” (ERPL). The focus of the socio-legal 
project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self-sufficient European private 
legal order in its interaction with national private law systems. The project aims at a new–orientation 
of the structures and methods of European private law based on its transformation from autonomy to 
functionalism in competition and regulation. It suggests the emergence of a self-sufficient European 
private law, composed of three different layers (1) the sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general 
principles – provisionally termed competitive contract law – and (3) common principles of civil law. It 
elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and national private law systems around four normative 
models: (1) intrusion and substitution, (2) conflict and resistance, (3) hybridisation and (4) 
convergence. It analyses the new order of values, enshrined in the concept of access justice 
(Zugangsgerechtigkeit). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under 
the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement 
n. [269722]. 
 
Editors’ Contact Details 
Rónán Condon 
Phd Researcher In Law 
European University Institute 
Florence, Italy 
 
E-Mail: Ronan.Condon@Eui.Eu 
Barend van Leeuwen 
Phd Researcher In Law 
European University Institute 
Florence, Italy 
 
E-Mail: Barend.vanLeeuwen@Eui.Eu 
Abstract 
The Working Paper presents the first results of a research project on the application of Francovich 
State liability by national courts. The project is supervised by Prof. Hans-W. Micklitz (EUI) and  
Prof. Takis Tridimas (KCL). Research has been undertaken in ten Member States to identify all cases 
in which State liability on the basis of the Francovich criteria was claimed in national courts. For each 
case researchers were asked to complete a case sheet. Finally, they were asked to write a short report 
with the results for their Member State. The conclusion analyses some of the trends. It is clear that, 
while national courts have not opposed the application of the conditions for Francovich State liability, 
they are still struggling to integrate these conditions in their national laws on State liability. The result 
can only be described as something of a hybrid, which requires further analysis in the future.  
It is hoped that this Working Paper will provide a sound basis for further research. 
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Introduction 
Rónán Condon and Barend van Leeuwen 
 
‘We daily pour new wine into old bottles and apparently most of us never know the difference’
1
 
The starting point 
The examination of the development of Francovich liability in the national courts of the Member 
States remains a gap in our understanding of this hybrid remedy.
2
 To be sure, comprehensive studies 
exist that examine the development of Francovich liability at the level of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‘CJEU’) and these studies tell a particular story.3 However, the main assumption of 
this working paper is that how the Member State courts treat the conditions of liability can deepen this 
understanding by complementing the existing ‘top-down’ analysis with a ‘bottom-up’ perspective that 
examines how the conditions of liability are applied by national courts.  
 The defining characteristic of Francovich liability is its division of labour. The conditions of liability 
– conferral of a right, sufficiently serious breach, and causation – are autonomous of national legal 
concepts.
4
 However, the application of these conditions to the facts before the courts is a task for the 
respective Member State judiciary. In addition, procedural issues of importance as to the degree to 
which a claimant is compensated, such as tort limitation periods and the law on mitigation of damages, 
remain within the competence of national courts – subject to the rules on equivalence and 
effectiveness of European law. In both respects, this Working Paper wishes to explore the extent to 
which this has led to divergent or convergent interpretations of the conditions of liability and their 
limitation across Member State jurisdictions. However, particular focus has been placed on the 
conditions of liability, because it is submitted that in their interpretation we can locate the extent to 
which this European tort has been integrated into the tort law of the Member States, or whether to 
twist Leon Greene’s analogy the old and new wines do not blend smoothly.5  
Francovich liability surprised and confounded many when it emerged in the early nineties given the 
previous position of the CJEU in the area of liability of Member States for civil damages.
6
 The 
partition of competences had appeared clear. The CJEU occupied itself exclusively with identifying 
                                                     
1
 L Greene ‘Tort Law Public Law in Disguise’ 38 Tex. L. Rev. 259 (1959-1960), 265.  
2
 P Giliker ‘English Tort Law and the Challenge of Francovich Liability: Twenty Years On’ (2012) L.Q.R. 541. 
Her examination of Francovich liability in UK law is illuminating and accords with what we found in our 
research to a large degree. 
3
 T Tridimas, ‘State Liability in Damages: Vingt Ans Apres’ (unpublished, with author); T. Lock, ‘Is private 
enforcement of EU law through State liability a myth? An assessment 20 years after Francovich’, (2012) 49 
CML Rev 1675. Lock’s treatment of Francovich liability is less optimistic than Tridimas’s. 
4
 This became clear in Brasserie du Pecheur. The Court rejected the Member State submissions that the 
conditions could be equated with national conditions of liability, and emphasised the independent nature of 
the test of liability. 
5
 P Giliker (n 2) Coined the phrase ‘Eurotort’ in the scholarly literature. 
6
 Certain authors welcomed its introduction and found that it might be a useful palliative for problems in national 
law P Craig ‘Once More into the Breach: The Community, the State and Damages Liability (1997) 113 LQR 
67, others were less convinced see C Harlow ‘Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State’ (1996) 2 
EurLK 199. In the first decade after the Francovich judgment much ink was spilt see T Tridimas The 
General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn. OUP 2006) 498, fn. 1 for a comprehensive list of the scholarly 
contributions. 
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breaches of rights derived from European law, while it remained for the Member States to devise 
remedies to compensate individuals prejudiced by these breaches. Nowhere more was this approach 
typified than in Rewe which declared that the EU Treaty ‘was not intended to create new remedies’.7 
Francovich and Brasserie du Pecheur radically altered the landscape by providing an autonomous 
European tort law basis of recovery against the state when it has acted in breach of European law. 
Francovich made clear that the Treaty did in fact give rise to remedies, which were required on an 
effectiveness of European law and judicial cooperation justification.
8
 The CJEU, it is uncontroversial 
to say, discovered Francovich liability in a mood of judicial activism.
9
  Brasserie muddied the water 
somewhat as to the exact legal basis of Francovich liability, but nevertheless announced the arrival of 
an autonomous European tort - a ‘Eurotort’ in short.10 The CJEU, in particular, went considerably far 
to delineate the three conditions of liability. By far the most detailed analysis was devoted to the 
sufficiently serious breach condition, and, therefore, for the purposes of this Working Paper it is this 
condition that we examine in the greatest focus. To the extent, however, that other conditions of 
liability proved to be the question on which liability turned at the Member State level these conditions 
are also discussed. In addition, the CJEU stated that the tort was applicable to all branches of the state, 
the case-law of the court progressively expanded recovery from the administration to the legislature, 
and finally to the courts themselves in Köbler.   
Francovich liability touches an area of law that has traditionally invoked controversy, namely, State 
liability. The degree to which the state can be held liable varies across Member State jurisdictions and 
is underpinned by different ideologies of the state.
11
 These have traditionally impacted on the extent to 
which the state, its agencies and agents, can be held liable in tort law.
12 
Despite the more liberal 
approaches to recovery against the administration, notably in France, in all jurisdictions it has been 
difficult if not impossible to recover against the legislature, and, in particular, the judicial branch of 
government. The reasons for these difficulties are legion. Notably, the balance between democracy 
and the rule of law features prominently as a reason against recovery, as does the doctrine of 
parliamentary supremacy which tends to underlie this issue. In more exact terms, the use of 
discretionary power by the government, the degree to which it is appropriate for a court to ‘second-
guess’ through liability claims the use of such discretion, and the question of the appropriate allocation 
of resources are familiar arguments that tend to militate against the growing emphasis on the rights of 
claimants to tort law recovery.
13
 We might question, therefore, the extent to which these types of 
arguments prevail upon national courts in their interpretation of the conditions of Francovich liability 
and, in particular, their treatment of what constitutes a sufficiently serious breach. 
The national reports that follow hopefully go some way to obtaining a better understanding of these 
issues. These reports are the culmination of a research process that began in early 2013. At that 
juncture, a research project was started at the European University Institute (“EUI”) to investigate the 
impact of Francovich liability at the national level. The project is supervised by Professor Hans 
Micklitz (EUI) and Professor Takis Tridimas (King’s College, London). It is funded by the ERC grant 
                                                     
7
 Case C 158/80 Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord v Hauptzollamt Kiel [1981] ECR 1805. 
8
 Francovich paras. 33-36. 
9
 Tridimas (n 3) “Although in the Court’s own postulation state liability is “inherent in the system of the Treaty”, 
its origins lie in the effects-driven reasoning of the ECJ and its determination to turn “constitutional ideas 
into living truths.” (Citations omitted) 
10
 P Giliker (n 2). 
11
 J Allison A Continental Distinction in the Common Law: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on 
English Public Law (OUP 2000). 
12
 However, it has been argued that this difference is more a matter of form than substance. C Harlow 
‘Administrative Liability: A Comparative Study of French and English Law’ (Ph.d thesis, 1979) 
13
 Despite the tendency to view the remedy as sanction-based, the Court stated in AGM COS.MET that the 
remedy is a compensatory one.  
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3 
on European Regulatory Private Law. The ultimate aim of the project is to analyse to what extent 
Francovich liability has been integrated in the State liability regimes of the Member States and to see 
how effective it is as a remedy from the perspective of EU law. 
In order to be able to undertake this analysis, a team of PhD researchers at the EUI, or connected to the 
EUI, was asked to search for case-law in which damages were claimed in national courts under the 
conditions for Francovich liability. In total, ten Member States have been included in the project. For 
each of these Member States the aim was to identify all cases in which Francovich liability was 
considered by national courts between 2000 and 2013. The precise methodology of the project will be 
set out in the next section of this introduction. It is important to note that the research at the national 
level provides just a starting point for the project. The aim is to identify trends and to select a number 
of issues or areas for further detailed analysis. As such, this Working Paper provides a rich source of 
information which will enable further analysis. Nevertheless, in the final section of the Working Paper 
we make some provisional conclusions based on the research to date, and propose further research 
questions that might assist in the future direction of our research. 
Methodology  
Researchers from a number of Member States with different legal traditions were asked to check 
national case-law databases for judgments in which the Francovich criteria for State liability were 
applied by national courts. In total, ten Member States were selected. These Member States were 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Poland and the United 
Kingdom. We analysed these particular Member States because we wanted to examine common law 
jurisdictions, the main civil law jurisdictions, at least one post-2004 accession Member State, and a 
Nordic jurisdiction. Our aim was not to obtain a complete picture of Francovich liability at the 
Member State level, but to obtain a representative sample to test the degree to which Francovich 
liability has been applied in Member State legal systems.  
The online availability of judgments of national courts varies significantly across the Member States 
examined. In some Member States only judgments of the higher courts are available online. In other 
Member States, certain judgments of lower courts are reported, but not all of them. In certain 
jurisdictions, such as Greece or the United Kingdom, it is necessary to use private subscription 
databases to access judgments. Researchers were asked to use all online search databases available to 
them and to indicate which database(s) they used for their search. We asked researches to confine their 
search to judgments issued by the superior courts of the respective member states. In other words, 
issued by the (i) High Court (or equivalent), (ii) Court of Appeal (or equivalent) and (iii) Supreme 
Court (or equivalent). We confined the search in this manner to render it manageable in terms of the 
timeline envisaged for the project, and because the superior courts are those which interpret the law.  
The reference period was the period from 1st January 2000 to 31st December 2013. The date of the 
judgment determined whether or not a case was included. However, some researchers (e.g. Ireland, 
Italy) included judgments from before the reference period in the context section of their research with 
a view to explaining the case-law. These results were not included in the statistical analysis which 
includes only judgments issued post-2000. 
Researchers were asked to search broadly for relevant cases. They were asked to use their own 
experience of national databases to ensure that all relevant cases could be identified. We asked 
researchers to search using the following search terms: 
 Francovich 
 Substantive criteria: “sufficiently serious breach” or “conferral of right” 
 Other important judgments, such as Brasserie du Pecheur/Factortame, Dillenkofer, Köbler  
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These terms were meant to be non-exhaustive, and merely indicatory of what might disclose 
judgments. Researchers were asked to provide other search terms which they might have used and to 
explain why they used them. These explanations are furnished below in the methodological sections 
affixed to each Member State report. On the basis of this search exercise, researchers were asked to 
make a list with relevant judgments. Judgments were relevant if they discussed Francovich State 
liability as a ‘real’ possibility. In other words, it must have been discussed by the national court as a 
potential remedy in the particular judgment. This could be tested by analysing whether the national 
court discussed the substantive criteria for State liability. Mere passing references to the Francovich 
case were not sufficient. 
For all relevant judgments, researchers were asked to complete an individual case form. For judgments 
in which different levels of courts had given a judgment, only one case sheet was completed and the 
final result was filled in the case form. Reference to the results of the lower courts was made in the 
factual and legal background.  
Researchers were asked to provide the following information on the case form: 
1. Case reference 
2. Subject matter 
3. Type of claimant (individual, business, collective) 
4. Level of national court 
5. Factual and legal background 
6. Relevant conditions of liability 
7. Other causes of action 
8. Outcome 
Researchers were asked to complete a short report for each Member State. These reports appear in the 
following section, along with an account of the methodology used, and the difficulties, if relevant, 
encountered by researchers. 
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Finland 
Mira Turpeinen (PhD Researcher, University of Turku, Finland) 
Statistics 
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Social security  1 
Taxation  1 
Total  2 
 Court level Number of cases 
Last instance  2 
Total  2 
 Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual  1 
Business  1 
Total  2 
Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful  1 
Claim (ongoing)  1 
Total  2 
Conditions of   
liability considered 
Number of cases 
Sufficiently serious breach  2 
Total  2 
Methodology 
 
The search was conducted using the following Finnish online up-to-date databases: Finlex and Edilex. 
The former is a free and public online database, owned by the Finnish Ministry of Justice, whereas the 
latter is a private legal information service produced by Edita Publishing Ltd. Both of these databases 
include the whole text of all the judgments of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative 
Court that have been published in their annals. Moreover, they contain the texts of the judgments of 
the Courts of Appeal from 2004 onwards and summaries from the earlier judgments of the Courts of 
Appeal. Thus, the judgments (or, in the case of Courts of Appeal, at least their summaries) delivered in 
the period of 1
st
 January 2000 to 31
st
 December 2013 should all be available online.  
 
For the search the following search terms were used: Francovich, Brasserie and/or Factortame and 
Köbler. In addition, I used the names of other State liability case-law. Finally, more substantive and 
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broader terms were included such as “sufficiently serious breach”, “conferral of rights”, “State 
liability”, “liability for damages and state” or even “European Union law”. The terms chosen in the 
search followed the typical classification in the above-mentioned online databases which were also 
based on the previous cases on State liability.  
Context 
In Finland, the liability of public authorities has been an interesting and, to some extent, a questionable 
mixture of tort law and administrative law. In this paragraph, the national context regarding the 
liability of public authorities when they are exercising public power is briefly introduced. These 
observations are mainly based on doctoral research by Suvianna Hakalehto-Wainio
14
. The liability for 
non-contractual damages is primarily regulated in the Tort Liability Act (the Act), which also contains 
special provisions regarding the liability of public authorities or other entities when they exercising 
public power (Chapter 3 of the Act). According to Chapter 3, Section 2(1), the liability of public 
authorities is based on negligence and arises for injury or damage caused through an error or 
negligence in the exercise of public power. However, State liability differs from general tortious 
liability as the former is subsequently restricted by three provisions in Chapter 3 of the Act. The first 
restriction is found in Chapter 3, Section 2(3) of the Act which provides that liability arises only if the 
performance of the activity or task, in view of its nature and purpose, has not met the reasonable 
requirements set for it. In other words, this ‘standard provision’ mitigates the liability of public 
authorities in comparison to the general tortious liability inasmuch as it requires a higher level of 
negligence before the liability of public authorities arises. The second restriction can be found in the 
next section of the Act (Chapter 3, Section 4) which requires a prior appeal from the applicant. This 
means that one is entitled to damages only if the party has first appealed the decision by using all 
applicable legal remedies (after preliminary works including also possible an extraordinary appeal). 
The third restriction limits the liability of certain higher state organs, such as the Government, a 
Ministry, the Cabinet Office, a court of law or a judge. According to Chapter 3 Section 5 of the Act, an 
action for damages against the above-abovementioned state organs is not possible unless the decision 
has been amended or overturned or unless the person committing the error has been found guilty of 
misconduct or held personally liable in damages. Moreover, where a decision of an administrative 
authority has been appealed against the Government or the Supreme Administrative Court, no action 
in damages can be brought for injury or damage caused by the decision before it has become final.  
As to the compatibility of the Finnish State liability regime with the state liability doctrine under EU 
law, one could conclude that all the restrictions above might be somewhat problematic and could be 
the subject of reform. In fact, the Ministry of Justice ordered a report and guidelines for a possible 
reform of the state liability rules in 2010.
15
 Although Hakalaehto-Wainio concluded in her report that 
the general regulatory framework for damages mainly coincides with the State liability regime of the 
EU, she nevertheless suggested that all the above-mentioned restrictions to the liability for public 
authorities should be repealed, especially with regard to Chapter 3 Section 5, which is in clear 
contradiction with the case-law of the CJEU on State liability.
3
 This section was already disapplied by 
the Supreme Court in the EVL case precisely for this reason (see below case 1). At the moment, the 
Ministry of Justice is considering whether it would amend the national State liability system based on 
the report, but no concrete legislative actions has been taken yet. In this respect, it seems that EU law 
is pushing a reform of the Finnish liability regime concerning the liability for public authorities, which 
has somewhat curiously emphasised the immunity, fluent public administration and freedom of actions 
of public authorities rather than the protection of the weaker party and allocation of resources within a 
                                                     
14
 Suvianna Hakalehto-Wainio, Valta ja Vahinko: Julkisen Vallankäyttäjän vahingonkorvausvastuu  
15
 Suvianna Hakalehto-Wainio, Julkisyhteisön vahingonkorvausvastuu (Tort Liability of Public Authorities) Ministry of 
Justice 59/2010. 3 See ibid., at 73-81.  
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7 
asymmetric relationship between the individual and the state, as has been mentioned by Hakalehto-
Wainio.
16
 As a final remark, one might note that the Finnish legislation does not exclude compensation 
for economic loss but imposes certain limitations on this type of damage. This means that damage for 
economic loss is only compensated if it has been caused by an act punishable by law or in the exercise 
of public authority, or in other cases, where there are especially weighty reasons for the same. This 
question arose also in a preliminary reference from Finland in the case C 470/03 AGM-COS.MET
5
, but 
the Finnish legislator concluded that no legislative amendments were necessary because of the 
judgment.  
Narrative  
As only those cases in which Francovich liability was considered as a real potential remedy by 
national courts were to be included in this report, the cases in Finland were limited to two set of cases: 
the first case dealt with EVL related to car taxes on imported cars (KKO:2013:58) and the second case 
concerned social security issues (KHO:2012:104 and KHO:2012:105). The claimant in the first case 
was a business, albeit in a private capacity, and in the second case the claimant was an individual – a 
recipient of statutory social benefits. Both of the cases mainly focused on whether the breach was 
sufficiently serious. The applicant won the first case concerning EVL for used, imported cars and the 
state was liable to pay damages to the applicant. The second case is still pending because the Supreme 
Administrative Court decided to refer the case to the CJEU.  
Analysis 
Considering that there are only two cases in which the Finnish national courts thoroughly 
contemplated and applied Francovich conditions of liability, it is difficult to draw any clear 
conclusions about the Finnish liability case-law under EU law. However, in this paragraph a few 
observations will be made about both of the cases in order to help to demonstrate the underlying 
discourses and origins of the cases – especially with regard to a series of EVL decisions. However, 
firstly, this report will briefly address the question of whether State liability claims under EU law 
should be tried in civil or administrative courts. The CJEU has mainly left this question to be decided 
according to national procedural rules. In Finland, there is no legislation on this issue. Moreover, since 
the legal situation is unclear both for courts and academics, it is even more difficult for an individual 
to consider in which instance they should bring a claim for damages for the alleged breach of EU law 
by the state. As the Supreme Administrative Court concluded in the case KHO:2012:104, this may 
prove to be problematic as to the principle of effectiveness under EU law and the right to effective 
remedy inasmuch as the claim for damages under EU law is dismissed if a lower court considers that it 
has no jurisdiction on this issue. 
The second issue concerning the Finnish State liability cases under EU law deals with the distinction 
between the revision of judgments and the claim for damages under EU law. This issue will be 
discussed in relation to the judgment of the Supreme Court (KKO:2013:58) that relates to a long and 
partly overlapping series of judgments that have raised confusion in the national legal context. The 
judgment of the Supreme Court (KKO: 2013:58) on ELV relating to car taxes is a result of a chain of 
judgments starting from case KHO:2002:85 in which the Supreme Administrative Court asked for a 
preliminary ruling from the ECJ (C-101/00 tulliasiamies ja Antti Siilin
17
). In its judgment the CJEU 
concluded that EVL would not be contrary to EU law per se provided that it would not have a 
discriminatory effect on imported, used cars in comparison with the amount of the residual tax 
incorporated in the value of a similar used car already registered in the national territory. However, 
                                                     
16
 See ibid., Hakalehto-Wainio (2008) at 49-70 and 413. 5 Case C-470/03 AGM-COS.MET [2007] ECR I-2749.  
17
 Case C-101/00 Tulliasiamies and Antti Siilin [2002] ECR I—7487.  
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soon after the judgment it became clear that the legal situation remained ambiguous as regards the 
deduction of EVL at a later juncture in value added tax which was reserved only to those subject to 
VAT in Finland. This question was only indirectly raised in the above-mentioned preliminary 
reference Regardless of the general opinion of legal literature or the opinion of the Commission, the 
national authorities resorted to the interpretation as if the question of deduction was also resolved by 
the judgment in C-101/00 tulliasiamies ja Antti Siilin, which resulted in the judgment KKO 2002:85. 
The first claim for revision of this judgment was made in the case KHO:2006:95, in which the 
applicant also explicitly asked that a further preliminary reference on this issue should be made. Both 
of these claims were dismissed. At this time, the Commission had already noted that the right to 
reduce EVL was contrary to Article 90 EC. Some legislative amendments had been made in 2003 in 
Finland but they have not removed the debated issue. This was done not until 2009, when it was 
eventually decided that wrongly levied EVL should be reimbursed retrospectively from 2006. Finally, 
it was established in C-10/08 Commission v. Finland that the Finnish legislation as regards the 
qualified right to reduce EVL breached Article 90 EC. There have been many cases in which different 
applicants have sought a revision of the allegedly discriminatory EVL decisions. After the C-10/08 
Commission v. Finland decision, the previous dismissal in the case KHO:2006:95 to revise the original 
car tax case was challenged in the cases KHO:2010:44 and KHO:2010:45,  which were, in turn, 
challenged in the case KHO:2013:199. The latter case was filed after the successful State liability case 
discussed herein, but all of these revision claims were eventually dismissed by the Supreme 
Administrative Court. The subsequent satellite judgments show that the claimants have more than 
likely sought a revision of the allegedly discriminatory EVL decisions rather than filed a claim in 
damages under EU law. The reason might be Section 3(4) in Chapter 3 of the Tort liability Act 
requires a prior appeal (according to the preliminary work of the Act including also an extraordinary 
appeal) from the decision before a claim in damages is possible. This may prove to be unsatisfactory 
for the applicant who could be more successful with a claim for in damages under EU law as the 
Finnish court illustrate a clear resistance to annul the judgment even if this judgment ‘sufficiently’ 
breaches EU law. However, the recent State liability case in the Supreme Court on EVL relating to car 
taxes seems to represent some kind of paradigmatic shift in this respect.   
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France 
Hubert de Verdelhan (Legal Secretary (Administrateur/Juriste), Chambers of Judge K. Jürimäe, Court 
of Justice of the European Union)
*
 
Statistics 
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Agriculture 7 
Employment 38 
Environmental protection 1 
Free movement of goods 10 
Social security 1 
Taxation 3 
Health 9 
Discrimination  60 
Allocation of EU funds 1 
Competition 1 
Total 131 
Court level Number of cases 
Last instance 13 
Court of Appeal 118 
Total 131 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 100 
Business 29 
Collective (group of individuals, 
group of business, associations) 
2 
Total 131 
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Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 20 
Claim dismissed 110 
Preliminary ruling 1 
Total 131 
Methodology 
The databases used were Arineweb and Legifrance. The first one is provided by the Conseil d’État, the 
French administrative supreme court, and grants access to the case-law of this jurisdiction, together 
with the essential judgments rendered by the appeal courts. The second one is the main French public 
database for legal material, including statutes and rulings. It contains the judgments from appeal and 
supreme level courts, and some first instance judgments. 
The terms used for the research were the followings: “Francovich”; “responsabilité” combined with 
“droit communautaire” or “droit de l’Union”; “responsabilité” combined with “directive”, 
“règlement”, “traité CE” or “traité FUE”. 
Context 
State liability in the French legal system has several peculiarities. First, it is characterised by its 
autonomy from the general rules on liability provided in the Code civil
18
, which was decided by the 
French Tribunal des Conflict in the benchmark Blanco case in 1873
19
. State liability was thereby 
declared to be neither general nor absolute, but to obey to special rules. These special rules have been 
progressively established by the case-law of the Conseil d’État, the French Administrative Supreme 
Court. State liability under French law now concerns all the organs of the State, but operates under a 
variety of rules, mostly diverging in the requirement of fault (the activity of the State at stake being 
either under a regime of manifest breach, simple breach or strict liability). Notably, liability of the 
State for the performance of its judicial function was recognised in 1978 in Darmont
20
; however, it 
was initially limited to procedural aspects (excessive length of the proceedings, for instance
21
). 
Liability of the State for harm caused by a statute of the parliament (“loi”) has been possible since the 
ruling of 1938 Société “La Fleurette”
22
, in case of “serious” and “special” harm, on the ground of a 
breach of equality in relation to public burden. However, the Conseil d’État had established in its 
ruling Nicolo that it would not rule on the liability of the state acting in its legislative function
23
. The 
interpretation of EU law before French courts has challenged this approach. The first case related to 
the incompatibility of an administrative act with EU law, Société Arizona Tobacco Products et SA 
Philip Morris France
24
, concerned a regulation adopted on the basis of a statute contrary to EU law. 
The Conseil d’État chose to set aside the statute as incompatible with EU law and held the State liable 
on the ground that the regulation had been adopted without a legal basis. The source of the liability 
                                                     
*
The views expressed in this report are strictly personal.  
18
 Code civil, articles 1382 to 1386. 
19
 Tribunal des conflits, 8 February 1873, Blanco, rec. 00012. 
20
 CE, 29 December 1978, Darmont, Dalloz 1979, p. 278, note Vasseur. 
21
 CE, 28 June 2002, Magiera, rec. 239575. 
22
 CE, 14 January 1938, Société anonyme des produits laitiers “La Fleurette”, rec. 51704. 
23
 CE, 20 October 1989, Nicolo, rec. 108243. 
24
 CE 28 February 1992, SA Philip Morris France, rec. 87753. 
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was, therefore, a purely national breach of the duty of legality. In its Gardedieu
25
 ruling in 2007, the 
Conseil d’État recognised the possibility of the State being liable for a statute incompatible with its 
international obligations. While the case concerned a breach of rights guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, its broad scope of application included EU law. Eventually, in 2008, in 
Gestas
26
 the Conseil d’État acknowledged Köbler and confirmed the essence of its wording, thus 
opening up the possibility of State liability for the performance of its judicial function – not only on 
procedural grounds, but also where the substance of a definitive ruling amounts to a manifest breach 
of EU law. Both with regards to the State function subject to liability rules and to the conditions for 
liability (manifest breach, causation and harm, with the exception to the Gardedieu type of liability, 
which appears to be a strict liability/no-fault regime), French law complies with EU law. Although 
State liability was already broadly construed, it can be said that Francovich and Köbler resulted in the 
extension of the scope of liability of the State, as demonstrated by Gestas and Gardedieu. 
Narrative 
In the relevant time period, namely 2000-2013, 131 cases involving questions related to liability of the 
State for breaches of EU law were found. Only 20 of these were successful claims, although some of 
the dismissed claimants were compensated on other grounds (such as a breach of ECHR
27
, or of 
national law
28
).  
Francovich liability was invoked in very different fields, ranging from free movement of goods to 
employment law and agricultural funds. Notably, two cases
29
 present a factual background similar to 
the one at stake in Francovich, related to guarantee funds for wage claims in case of insolvency of the 
employer. 
As for the State function involved, most of the cases concerned a failure of the administration to act in 
compliance with EU law. Several cases concerned a failure of the legislator to comply with EU law 
(Bleitrach, Leone
30
); one case, Société Phytoservice II
31
, concerned Köbler-style liability of the State 
in the performance of its judicial function.  
Analysis  
Most of the time, the appeal courts and the Conseil d’État upheld the existence of a breach of EU law 
where it had already been established by a prior judgment of the CJEU (this can be seen for instance in 
Société Bruyagri
32
, Association “Halte aux marées vertes”33, Société CRT34). However, in Association 
                                                     
25
 CE, 08 February 2007, Gardedieu, rec. 279522. 
26
 CE, 18 June 2008, Gestas, RFDA 2008.755, conclusions de SALINS. 
27
 See, for instance, CE, 37 July 2009, Société Ulysse SAS, rec. 316525. 
28
 See, for instance, CE, 22 October 2010, Bleitrach, rec. 301572. 
29
 CA Marseille, 21 February 2011, 09MA00892, 09MA00706. 
30
 CA Lyon, 24 September 2013, Leone, 12LY02990. Leone concerned the compatibility of a certain pension 
benefit attributed to public servants parenting children with the principle of non-discrimination on ground of 
sex. The Conseil d’État, facing a flow of proceedings concerning said issue, ruled this benefit to be 
compatible with article 141 TCE. However, the appeal court in Leone chose to refer the issue to the CJEU, 
which declared this benefit to amount to an indirect discrimination on ground of sex, contrary to article 141 
TEC (ECJ, 17 July 2014, Leone and Leone, C-173/13). 
31
 CE, 27 March 2013, Société Phytoservice, rec. 351528. The Conseil had to establish whether or not it had 
committed a manifest breach of EU law in its previous ruling Société Phytoservice (CE, 30 December 2009, 
rec. 303506) where it ruled that the State was not liable for maintaining a prior authorisation regime 
incompatible with EU law. 
32
 CE, 24 July 2009, Société Bruyagri, rec. 296140. 
The Application of Francovich State Liability by National Courts 
12 
“Halte aux marées vertes”, the Court of Appeal went beyond the mere acknowledgment of the finding 
of an infringement by the CJEU by stating that the alleged failures of the State had to be considered 
“important” and “numerous”, thus amounting to a manifest breach. It also referred to prior judgments 
of the CJEU to establish that there was no manifest breach (Société Ulysse and Société Cargill
35
). 
In relation to the branches of government, it appears that the Conseil d’État seems reluctant to find a 
manifest breach where the judicial or legislative function of the State is at stake. In Société 
Phytoservice II, the Conseil d’État rejected without in-depth reasoning the claim that it had committed 
a manifest breach in its ruling Société Phytoservice, even though the test it applied to reject causality 
seemed overly strict, and it ignored the fact that in its Société Bruyagri ruling, delivered shortly 
before, it adopted a more lenient approach in that respect, in a situation very similar to the one at stake 
in Société Phytoservice. In Bleitrach, it interpreted the requirements of the Employment Equality 
Framework Directive
36
 as regards the deadline for making all working places suitable for disabled 
people to establish that the State had not breached EU law when postponing the compliance of all 
public premises to said requirements, without sending the issue to the CJEU for a preliminary 
reference. This tendency is also visible in the Société Sirio
37
 ruling, in which the appeal court ruled 
that a tax incompatible with EU law amounted to a failure of the legislator (who adopted the principle 
of the tax) to respect its international obligations (Gardedieu-style). However, on appeal, the Conseil 
d’État, rejected the approach of the appeal court and ruled that the breach was committed by the 
administration when adopting the implementing regulation on the tax. 
As regard causation, the Conseil d’État, in principle, applies a rather strict test (“causalité adéquate”) 
which sometimes leads to harsh results – perhaps questionable from the perspective of EU law. In 
Société Phytoservice, the claimant sought compensation partially for the harm he suffered from fiscal 
redress after he had imported goods on the French market without authorisation. Although the French 
authorisation mechanism did not comply with EU law, the Conseil ruled that there was no causal link 
between the incompatibility of the authorization procedure and the harm, since the company never 
asked for any authorisation from the State in the first place. Interestingly, this harsh assessment of 
causation had been rejected shortly before in Société Bruyagri, where the Conseil had ruled that there 
was causation between the harm of the claimant and the breach of the State – the failure to set in place 
an authorisation procedure compliant with EU law – notwithstanding the fact that the claimant had 
never applied for an authorisation to import. A striking example of the application of the adequate 
causation test can also be found in Lafaye de Michaux
38
, where the appeal court denied causation 
between the fault of the administration – which had unlawfully retained 20000€ of EU funds allocated 
to a company for a development project – and the bankruptcy of this company, on the ground that the 
expenditures of the company with respect to the project were higher than the sum retained, and it had 
not demonstrated how it intended to pay the rest of the said expenditures. Camuset
39
 provides, in 
addition, a good example of the strict interpretation of causation: while the claimant alleged that his 
employer, a municipality, would have converted his numerous and consecutive fixed term contracts 
into an indefinite duration one if the legislator had correctly transposed the Directive on fixed-term 
work
40
, the appeal court considered that the harm was suffered by the claimant when his contract did 
(Contd.)                                                                  
33
 CA Nantes, 1 December 2009, Association “Halte aux marées vertes”, rec. 324925. 
34
 CE, 3August 2011, Société CRT France International, rec. 304838. 
35
 CE, 31 July 2009, Société Cargill France, rec. 324925. 
36
 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (OJ L 303, p. 16). 
37
 CE, 3 August 2011, Société Sirio Antenne SRL, rec. 322041. 
38
 CA Marseille, 17 November 2009, Lafaye de Michaux, 07MA00055. 
39
 CA Douai, 9 June 2011, M. Camuset, 10DA00077. 
40
 Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work 
concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ L 175, p. 43). 
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not get renewed rather than when the legislator failed to transpose the Directive. Such a strict test of 
causation makes it almost impossible for a claimant to obtain compensation for a failure of the 
legislator to comply with EU law, as another cause for the harm could always be established, 
attributing the failure to another branch of the State. 
The Conseil d’État adopted a broad view of the harm requirement. In Société CRT, it admitted the 
principle that the loss of sale constitutes harm, while requiring concrete evidence that the loss was 
really consecutive to the breach of the state and not to external factors such as market tendencies. 
Notably, as regards exploitative loss, both the administrative courts and the Conseil d’État usually use 
a counterfactual scenario, assessing whether the turnover of a claimant company would have accrued 
if the State had not breached EU law (see for instance Société prodal
41
). However, some appeal courts 
have shown themselves to be particularly lenient with regards to the demonstration of harm by not 
requiring the claimant to actually “show figures”, but by rather assessing independently the harm on 
the sole ground that the breach of EU law had made the activity of the claimant “more difficult” (see 
Société Aprochim
42
). On the contrary, some appeal courts required actual evidence that the breach had 
hindered the activity of the claimant, and to what extend it had done so (Société “la biomécanique 
intégrée”43). 
Finally, on numerous occasions the appeal courts and the Conseil d’État chose not to refer preliminary 
rulings to the CJEU in cases where its interpretation of EU law was more than dubious. The 
compatibility of the French legislation on pensions, eventually tackled and referred in Leone, is a 
striking example. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
41
 CA Paris, 11 July 2007, Société Prodal, 06PA01658. 
42
 CA Nantes, 3 December 2007, Société Aprochim, 06NT01418. 
43
 CA Paris, 29 November 2006, Société “la biomécanique intégrée”, 03PA01140. 
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Germany 
Maria Jose Schmidt-Kessen (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics 
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Administrative 2 
Agriculture 3 
Banking 4 
Contract 2 
Criminal 1 
Corporate 1 
Employment 33 
Free movement of goods 3 
Free movement of persons 1 
Free movement of services/ 
establishment 
22 
Free movement of workers 1 
Health 2 
IP 1 
Taxation 5 
Trade 1 
Total 82 
Court level Number of cases 
Last instance 48 
Court of Appeal 20 
First instance 14 
Total 82 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 43 
Business 38 
Collective (group of 
individuals, group of 
businesses, associations) 
1 
Total 82 
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Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 32 
Claim dismissed 50 
Total 82 
Reason for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
Procedural lack of jurisdiction 
to hear state liability claim 
2 
No last instance (in case of 
Köbler-type claims) 
2 
No sufficiently serious breach 36 
No conferral of individual right 5 
No causal link 5 
Total 50 
Methodology 
To conduct the search of German case-law in which Francovich liability was claimed Juris, an online 
database, was used.
44
 It is a general legal database used by German practitioners, comparable to 
LexisNexis in the US or Dalloz in France. In terms of German case-law, it contains cases from 
regional courts, higher regional courts (appeal courts) and federal courts (last instance). However, not 
all judgments are reported.  The search was conducted mainly from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 
2013. 
The search terms used were 
1. “Francovich” (98 hits retrieved with the application of the filter of German regional and federal 
courts only) 
2. “Factortame” (74 hits retrieved with the application of the filter of German regional and federal 
courts only) 
3. Combination of “Köbler” and “Haftung”45 (65 hits retrieved with the application of the filter 
of German regional and federal courts only). 
Out of the total of 237 hits retrieved resulted 82 cases discussing the Francovich liability conditions 
(counting a judgment only once which went through several instances). 
While these search terms already resulted in a high absolute number of results, I expect there to be still 
many more cases that the above search did not retrieve. While reading and comparing the judgments, 
especially the same judgments at different instances, it became clear that German courts do not 
necessarily refer to the same CJEU’s case-law when discussing Francovich liability (this type of 
liability is referred to by German courts as “gemeinschaftsrechtlicher/unionsrechtlicher 
Staatshaftungsanpruch” and is clearly differentiated from the German State liability regime which is 
referred to as “Amtshaftungsanspruch (nach deutschem Recht)”). I expect that searching with other 
CJEU cases as search terms as e.g. “Brasserie du Pêcheur” or “Dillenkofer” would have delivered 
                                                     
44
 Juris – Das Rechstportal 
www.juris.de.ezproxy.eui.eu/jportal/portal/t/afm/page/homerl.psml?cmsuri=%2Fjuris%2Fde%2Fstartseite%2
Fstartseite.jsp (last visited 2 July 2014) 
45
 Haftung means “liability” in German 
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further cases from the ones found so far. Furthermore, some case reports do not refer to EU law at all 
when analysing Francovich liability claims, but only to German commentaries (e.g. the standard 
commentary on the EU Treaties, EUV / AEUV by Callies and Ruffert). Finding all these cases would 
mean to search e.g. with the search term “Staatshaftung” only (which yields 1660 hits for the relevant 
time frame).  
Context 
Francovich has been accepted in German case law as an autonomous basis for State liability 
(gemeinschaftsrechtlicher/unionsrechtlicher Staatshaftungsanspruch), in addition to the German 
doctrine of State liability (Amtshaftungsanspruch on the basis of § 839 para. 1 sentence 1 BGB (civil 
code) in conjunction with Art. 34 GG (German basic law)). One of the most important differences is 
that liability is construed strictly under EU State liability, i.e. without a fault requirement, whereas the 
German State liability doctrine requires fault (Verschulden) of the state official in question. 
Concerning Köbler-type liability for a breach of EU law by courts, the German law of State liability is 
also different. Under certain circumstances, judges from any instance can be made liable under 
German law (again on the basis of §839 BGB). However, the requirement is, in light of the principle 
of judicial independence, a qualified form of fault (intention/Vorsatz). Furthermore, there will be 
generally no liability when a court decision was handed down after deliberation with other judges. 
This means that whenever a decision is taken by a senate with several members there will be no 
liability for individual judges under German law (BGH III ZR 9/91). 
State liability under EU law supplements German State liability law, because it does not include a 
fault requirement. Consequently, it would appear easier for claimants to receive damages under EU 
State liability law than under German liability law.  
Narrative 
The search using the above methodology yielded a total of 82 cases that discussed the conditions of 
EU State liability. About half of the cases (48 cases) were final instance cases, followed by 20 appeal 
cases and 14 first instance cases. The claimants were mostly individuals (in 43 cases) and undertakings 
(in 38 cases). A very high number of claims were brought in the area of employment (33 cases) and 
freedom of services (22 cases). In approximately one-third of the cases the claimant was successful 
(32 cases). The most frequent reason for dismissing a State liability claim was that there was no 
sufficiently serious breach of EU law (in 36 cases out of a total of 50 dismissed cases). This was, in 
particular, the case when the breach had occurred before the CJEU had found that there had been a 
breach of EU law. 
Analysis  
Overall, Francovich has been well received by German courts. Courts at all levels seem to handle the 
Francovich criteria comfortably. The case-law shows a tendency, however, against awarding damages. 
In particular, German courts have been reluctant to award Francovich damages in cases where a 
breach of EU law had not (yet) been established by the CJEU. As a rule, in these cases, the sufficiently 
serious breach-condition was found not be fulfilled because Member States had a wide margin of 
discretion when implementing EU law, or because it was only after clarification by the CJEU that it 
had become apparent that there had been a breach of EU law. In judgments in which there was 
existing German case-law confirming the compatibility with EU law prior to the CJEU’s judgment 
establishing a breach, the courts were especially reluctant to find a sufficiently serious breach of EU 
law (e.g. BVerwG, 8 C 20/12). Therefore, in circumstances where there is no blatant breach – such as 
a complete failure to implement a directive – German courts seem to be prepared to find a sufficiently 
serious breach only if there has been a prior judgment of the CJEU which found a breach. This 
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practice could run counter to the Francovich jurisprudence as explained by the CJEU in Danske 
Slagterier, Brasserie du Pêcheur and Dillenkofer: In these judgments it was established that the 
reparation of loss or damage cannot be made conditional on the requirement that there has been a prior 
finding by the CJEU of an infringement of EU law attributable to the state. 
The two most obvious patterns are the high number of cases decided at last instance (48 cases: more 
than half) and the two areas of law, employment and freedom of services, in which most cases were 
decided. The high number of employment cases is related to the high number of cases decided at last 
instance. Of the 33 employment cases, almost all were brought by firefighters who had worked 
overtime. 22 of these cases were decided in parallel proceedings by the Federal Administrative Court 
(BVerwG) after the CJEU had held in Fuß, on the basis of the Working Time Directive, that the 
relevant German law was contrary to the Directive. In all the firefighter cases, State liability was 
established and damages were awarded. The high number of cases in the area of freedom of services 
(22 cases) concerned the laws of the Länder which prohibited the provision of sport betting and 
gambling services (also over the Internet) by private service providers. The Land monopoly on sport 
betting and gambling services was challenged after the CJEU’s judgment in Carmen Media and other 
cases on gambling services, leading, inter alia, to 10 parallel cases decided by the BVerwG. In all 
these cases State liability was denied, because the Member States’ margin of discretion had been wide 
in this area and the legal situation under EU law had been unclear before the CJEU’s judgments. There 
was, therefore, no sufficiently serious breach of EU law according to all German courts.  
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Greece 
Mihalis Decastros (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics 
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Education 1 
Property (expropriation) 1 
Employment 2 
Total 4 
Court level Number of cases 
First instance 4 
Total 4 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 4 
Total 4 
Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 2 
Claim dismissed 2 
Total 4 
Reason for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
No conferral of individual right 1 
No damage 1 
Total 2 
Methodology 
In Greece, for privacy reasons, court judgments are not available online for everyone to access. There 
are, however, subscription-based databases that judges and practitioners use in order to access 
judgments online. Therefore, for my research, I used the two main databases, one privately managed 
and the other one operated by the Athens Bar. The links to these websites are the following: 
1. https://lawdb.intrasoftnet.com 
2. http://www.dsanet.gr 
It should, however, be noted that the most important decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court 
(“Conseil d’Etat”) are usually available online under a “recent important judgments” section. 
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Context 
Greek Law, until 1946, did not have any statutory basis which regulated the conditions under which 
State liability to pay damages for harm could arise. There was some case law on the matter, but the 
issue remained unsettled. This vague state of affairs was later clarified by the introduction of the new 
Civil Code of 1946, which provided for State liability under Articles 104-106 of its “Introductory 
Law”. 
The Articles provide for the existence of 5 conditions for State liability. First of all, there must have 
been an act or omission committed by an organ of the State (widely interpreted, since this would cover 
the category of “legal persons under public law” that referred to most public companies existing at the 
time and for many more decades). Secondly, the act must have been committed by the relevant State 
organ in the exercise of public authority. Thirdly, this aforementioned act must be unlawful. 
Interestingly, for the purposes of this research, it is widely accepted that the element of illegality is 
fulfilled when there is a violation of EU Law (since under Article 28§1 of the Constitution the widely 
accepted principles of international law along with the treaties ratified by the State automatically 
become part of domestic law and supersede any other incompatible domestic law already in place). It 
is now also accepted (after some controversy that persisted for years – until the late eighties, early 
nineties) that even the Parliament itself (as a state organ) can commit an unlawful act merely through 
its legislative activities (if the relevant law violated the Constitution, EU Law or other treaties 
incorporated by virtue of Article 28§1 of the Constitution). Fourthly, the illegality cannot be based on 
the violation of a provision that was intended to protect the general public interest. Finally, the 
claimant must have suffered damages. The literature and case law have also recognised the existence 
of an additional implicit condition, namely the existence of a causal nexus between the damage and 
the unlawful act. 
It is clear that the conditions for State liability under Greek law are relatively similar to those under 
EU law. However, the most important difference is that there is no requirement of a sufficiently 
serious breach. Therefore, it seems that the requirements under Greek law are more favourable than 
under EU law. This raises interesting questions regarding the relationship between the EU and 
domestic law remedies for State liability, which will be discussed below. 
Narrative 
In total, four relevant cases were found. Half of the cases were brought in the field of employment 
law. In all these cases, Francovich liability was usually not the main claim but an additional basis for 
claiming damages. The other two cases concerned issues of education (mutual recognition of 
employment rights) and expropriation of property. All the cases were individual claims.  
Two of the cases were successful, while the other two were unsuccessful.  In the first of the 
unsuccessful cases, the reason was that the Court was not satisfied that EU law had conferred direct 
rights on individuals. In the other case, the Court found that the claimant had not suffered damages.  
Analysis 
Greek courts have, in general, been very receptive to the idea of State liability for violations of EU law 
and have to a large extent incorporated the relevant jurisprudence of the CJEU into their reasoning. 
The first main and probably the most interesting conclusion we can draw is that the Greek courts do 
not perceive Francovich liability as a completely separate legal basis on which individuals can base 
claims for compensation. On the contrary, they seem to conflate the relevant notion of compensation 
for unlawful acts and omissions of the state under domestic law with the similar notion of Francovich  
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liability. In that context, they always refer to the Francovich conditions, but they seem to perceive 
them as an additional basis for the unlawfulness of the state’s conduct. If they are satisfied that 
illegality is present, they then proceed to examine the rest of the conditions set out under Article 105 
of the Greek Introductory Law of the Greek Civil Code (e.g. existence of damage, causal nexus etc). 
In that context, the Greek courts do not consider the Francovich case-law as introducing a new remedy 
under domestic law. They rather incorporate the substantive elements of the case-law in their 
interpretation of Article 105 but, at the end of the process, the remedy awarded is a domestic law 
remedy. 
Furthermore, another interesting observation is that the courts are unwilling to accept that a claim for 
compensation can be based on the allegation that the courts themselves have failed to interpret and 
implement EU law properly (case 17346/2008). Moreover, a possibly more minor conclusion is that 
the courts consistently consider the ECHR as part of primary EU law and do not hesitate to award 
compensation on the basis of that (despite the fact that this unnecessary since, according to the Greek 
Constitution, the ECHR is at a higher normative level than normal domestic law). 
A final conclusion that can be drawn is that whenever there has been a CJEU judgment condemning 
Greece for the failure to incorporate or implement a directive properly, the courts always take that into 
account and are more willing to award compensation to individuals. 
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Ireland 
Rónán Condon (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics 
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Agriculture 2 
Asylum and immigration  
Employment 1 
Environmental protection  
Free movement of goods  
Social security  
State aid  
Taxation  
Health 1 
Cross-border cooperation 1 
Total 5 
Court level Number of cases 
Last instance  
Court of Appeal  
First instance 5 
Total 5 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 2 
Business 3 
Collective (group of individuals, 
group of businesses, 
associations) 
 
Total 5 
Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 1 
Claim dismissed 4 
Total 5 
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Reason for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
Procedural (incl. limitation 
period) 
 
No breach of EU law 2 
No sufficiently serious breach 0 
No conferral of individual right  
No causal link 2 
Total 4 
Methodology 
I used westlaw.ie and bailii.org to search for Francovich liability judgments. I examined judgments 
both prior to 2000 and post-2000, but for the purposes of analysis restricted statistical entry to the 
post-2000 judgments. The pre-2000 judgments assisted in establishing context. The main search terms 
used were, ‘State liability’, ‘sufficiently serious breach’, and ‘conferral of a right’. In addition, a 
number of leading cases were used as search terms, such as ‘Francovich’, ‘Brasserie’, ‘Köbler’, 
‘Brinkmann’, and so on. From an initial find of 32 judgments, these were filtered in accordance with 
our ‘relevance’ requirement.  
Context 
The starting point for an analysis of Francovich liability in Irish law is Carroll J’s statement in 
Robinson v Minister for Social Welfare [1995] E.L.R. 86. In that judgment Carroll J. distinguished 
between breach of statutory duty, breach of the duty of care, breach of a constitutional duty and 
Francovich liability:  
In my opinion, the wrong committed by the State in continuing the discrimination by failing to fully 
implement the Directive is a wrong arising from Community law which has domestic effect. It is not a 
breach of constitutional rights; it is not a breach of statutory duty and it is not a breach of the duty of 
care. It is a breach of duty to implement the Directive and it approximates to a breach of constitutional 
duty. Every type of action which would be available in the national domestic law to ensure the 
observance of national law is available to ensure observance of the Directive once it took on the 
mantle of direct effect. 
It might be surmised, therefore, that Irish courts have been more careful than their English colleagues 
to conceptually distinguish Francovich liability as a distinct basis of liability and have foregone the 
temptation to elide it with existing grounds of recovery. However, this does not mean that Francovich 
claims have appeared often before the superior courts. To date, we have found only one example of a 
successfully litigated claim based on Francovich liability. 
Narrative 
To date, only five cases were litigated on the basis of Francovich liability. Two claims related to the 
field of agriculture, one to employment, one to health, and one to the subject of cross-border 
cooperation. A number of other judgments have referred to Francovich in passing but do not meet the 
relevance requirement following the methodology of our study.  
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Analysis 
Sufficiently Serious Breach 
Pre-2000 
The Irish courts have not extensively treated the relevant factors enumerated in Brasserie for a breach 
to be treated as sufficiently serious.
46
 Dublin Bus v. MIBI proposed to apply those factors in a ‘global 
fashion’ rather than conjunctively or disjunctively. It is accepted that internal arguments (internal to 
the national constitution) about the distribution of powers are not relevant (O’Reilly). In Maxwell v 
Min for Agriculture, McCracken J. stated that he was without guidance as how to apply the criteria, 
despite the factors enumerated in Brasserie. In Emerald Meats v Min for Agriculture the Supreme 
Court accepted that male fides did not have to be proven in a State liability case. 
Post-2000 
Two cases since 2000 have applied the Francovich criteria; the first was Rooney v Minister for 
Agriculture in the High Court. Laffoy J. accepted if arguendo conditions 1 and 2 (conferral of a right, 
sufficiently serious breach) were fulfilled, as a matter of causation the defendants were not liable. This 
was because the learned judge held that it was the plaintiff’s conduct that caused his loss. No reference 
was made to the CJEU’s jurisprudence for this conclusion (for example, no reference to the discussion 
of causation in Brinkmann). Second, in the far more extensively argued Bupa v Rev Commissioners 
(2013) (HC) case, Cooke J. applied the Bergaderm interpretation of Francovich. The learned judge 
stressed the complexity of the area, the positive steps taken by the Minister to obtain advice and 
consult the Commission, and the absence of actual loss, as reasons as to why the loss was not 
sufficiently serious. The last point overlapped with his comments on causation. In effect, the claimant 
did not suffer losses because he withdrew from the market before the impugned scheme (in breach of 
EU law) could be implemented against him. In consequence, Cooke J.’s argumentation relied partly on 
causation and partly on circumstances of mitigation to refuse liability. Therefore, of the two cases that 
dealt with Francovich both dismissed the claim on the basis of the conduct of the parties which was 
subsumed under the heading of causation, with sufficiently serious breach assumed for the sake of 
argument (Rooney), or, the breach was deemed not to sufficiently serious (Bupa).  
In Davis Joinery v Companies Acts (2013) (HC) Laffoy J. held that in light of Francovich II it was 
unlikely that the plaintiff would succeed, although clarification was required. Instead of making a 
preliminary reference, Laffoy J. found a national law mechanism to obtain a remedy for the plaintiff. 
The sufficiency of the breach, or otherwise, was not discussed. 
In Ogieriakhi v Min for Justice (2013) (HC) Hogan J. made a preliminary reference to the CJEU. In 
Ogieriakhi the plaintiff, a Nigerian, who was dismissed from his position at An Post (the postal 
service), argued that he was entitled to the protection of Directive 2004/38/EC specifically invoking 
his right to residence based on the rights of his spouse, a Union citizen. The facts of the case 
complicated matters because he did not reside with his wife for the relevant reference period, although 
he remained legally married. Hogan J. made clear that, in particular, Brasserie and ex parte BT 
indicate that a relevant factor regarding Francovich is the clarity of the Directive before referring the 
case to the CJEU. It will be recalled that this goes to whether a right is conferred and whether a breach 
is sufficiently serious. 
In the only case in which the claimant succeeded on the basis of Francovich there was no discussion 
of the Francovich criteria. Figary concerned a breach of statutory duty in which the statutory duty was 
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created on foot of a directive. The judge awarded damages against the state but did not discuss the 
relevant criteria at all, treating Francovich as if it were strict liability i.e. once a breach, then liability 
follows automatically. 
Conclusion 
By way of provisional conclusions, it is submitted that in the current state of the law it is difficult to 
speak of an Irish approach to Francovich liability. The number of cases that have reached the Superior 
Courts is low in absolute terms, and the treatment of the remedy has at times been terse.  What is clear 
is that in those cases which have examined the doctrine more thoroughly, causation plays an important 
role as a control mechanism, and in the recent case-law there appears to be an attempt by Justice 
Hogan to create a bridge between Francovich liability and fundamental rights protection. 
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Italy 
Federico Della Negra (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics 
 
Court Level Number of cases 
Last instance (civil) 41 
Last instance (administrative) 1 
Civil Court of Appeal 1 
First instance civil court 4 
Total 47 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 41 
Business 1 
Collective (groups of 
individuals) 
5 
Total 47 
Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 37 
Claim dismissed 10 
Total 47 
Reasons for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
Procedural 4 
No breach of EU law 0 
No sufficient serious breach 1 
No conferral of individual right 0 
No causal link 0 
No right to damages against 
the state (even though the 
state breached EU law, the 
individual cannot invoke  
a subjective right) against  
the state) 
5 
Total 10 
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Methodology 
First, to search for the case-law I used several Italian legal databases, such as “Pluris”, “Leggi 
d’Italia” and "Dejure" by looking for the following search words: “Francovich”, “Brasserie”, 
“Kobler”, "sufficiently serious breach" and "conferral of right". The database "Dejure" has proven to 
be the most reliable one insofar as it includes the majority of the judgments delivered in the relevant 
period (2000-2013). As regards the search words, “Francovich” was the most quoted one by Italian 
Courts which mention it (case reference and name) as a precedent even in the most recent judgments 
concerning State liability. The search term “Köbler” was useful to find the only relevant case 
concerning State liability for the breach of EU law related to the exercise of the judicial function. The 
other search terms give rise to results which were not specifically related to the Francovich liability. 
Second, even though the search period has been fixed from 2000 to 2013 I have included also some 
judgments delivered in 1995 and 1998 to illustrate the context. I think that these cases are of crucial 
importance to understand the development of State liability in Italy: they show the initial resistance of 
the Italian Supreme Court in recognizing the Francovich doctrine against the backdrop of the 
traditional State immunity principle. Moreover, in the report I have included not only the judgments 
which are directly related to the State liability regime set out in Francovich (e.g. conditions for 
liability) but also those which are indirectly related to Francovich, such as cases concerning limitation 
periods. Even though the latter do not really discuss (but rather presuppose) the liability regime set out 
by Francovich, they are of a certain relevance as they may affect the level of protection granted by the 
national legal system to the individual. 
Third, the most important problem I encountered in this research is certainly related to the scarcity of 
lower courts judgments available in the databases. Indeed, the Italian legal databases (which are not 
public) collect and report very few judgments of the first instance (Tribunal) and second instance 
(Court of Appeal) Courts. For this reason, the report is mostly based on the case-law of the Italian 
Supreme Court (civil chamber). Moreover, it is not always possible to “reconstruct” the history of the 
case, on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court, insofar as the decisions of the lower Courts 
are not always mentioned in the final judgments.  
Context 
In the leading Francovich judgment the Court of Justice (ECJ) held that Member States are liable for 
the losses caused to individuals for the breaches of EU law.
47
 This ruling pierced the veil of the State 
immunity principle which is still affirmed by Italian courts in relation to "domestic" State (legislator) 
liability. Although legal doctrine has acknowledged that the state can be held liable for damages 
caused due to the incorrect exercise of the legislative function (e.g. adoption of unconstitutional 
laws),
48
 Italian courts still refuse to acknowledge this principle. The idea that the legislator cannot be 
held liable since its action is justified by political and democratic reasons still prevents individuals 
from being compensated for breaches of national law. During the nineties the same argument was put 
forward by the Supreme Court in relation to State liability for a breach of EU law.  
More recently, Italian Court have abandoned such resistance by designing a liability regime – for 
breaches of EU law – which is in line with the Francovich judgment. Aside from the breach of EU 
law, “domestic” State liability is possible only for losses caused by administrative authorities or civil 
judges. In both cases, however, the liability regime, based on tort law, is narrower than that introduced 
by Francovich either because the claimant must provide evidence of an intentional or negligent act or 
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omission of the public body
49
  or because an intentional fault or serious misconduct in the exercise of 
the judicial functions must be proven.
50
  
Narrative 
Litigation concerning State liability for breaches of EU law essentially focusses on the failure to 
transpose EU directives by the Italian legislator. In two cases State liability caused by the 
administrative authorities and civil judges was at stake. The overwhelming majority of cases deal with 
the incorrect transposition of Directive 1980/987/EEC concerning the minimum level of protection for 
employees in the event of an employer’s insolvency, which gave rise to the Francovich judgment, and 
Directive 1982/76/EEC, supplementing the Directive 75/363/EEC, concerning the coordination of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in respect of activities of specialised 
doctors (44 out of 47 cases). A few cases deal with the incorrect transposition of Directive 
1985/577/EEC on doorstep sales and Directive 1995/59/EC on taxes other than turnover taxes which 
affect the consumption of manufactured tobacco.  
In the majority of cases the Italian courts, in particular, the Supreme Court (41 out of 47 cases are 
decided by the Supreme Court) ruled in favour of the claimant (37 out 47 cases). The other claims 
were dismissed because the Court affirmed the principle of State immunity (5), for procedural reasons 
(4) or because the breach of EU law was not sufficiently serious (1). Finally, the judgments examined 
were generally brought by individuals (41 out of 47 cases). Only in a few cases the claimants were a 
group (5) or a business (1).  
Analysis  
From 1995 to 2013 Italian courts have gradually strengthened the State liability regime for breaches of 
EU law.  
On the basis of their procedural autonomy, Italian courts have divided State liability into three 
different legal regimes: State immunity, tortious liability and contractual liability for breaches of 
statutory law. The background of this judicial evolution is mostly provided by the cases related to the 
failure to transpose Directive 1980/987/EEC (the Francovich follow-up cases) and Directive 
1982/76/EEC. However, in the first Francovich follow-up cases the Supreme Court followed a 
conservative approach and held that an individual cannot invoke any subjective right to the correct 
exercise of legislative power by the Parliament.
51
 For this reason, the failure to transpose the Directive 
could not give rise to an unlawful omission in the national legal order. 
In 1998, the Supreme Court stated, for the first time, that such omission was to be regarded as an 
“unlawful omission” in the meaning of Art. 2043 c.c.
52
 By acknowledging the principle of primacy of 
EU law, the Court admitted that a breach of EU law automatically resulted in a breach of national 
law.
53
 However, in many cases (mostly related to the dispute concerning the implementation of 
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Directive 1982/76/EEC) in which State liability was established in principle, no compensation was 
awarded to the claimants because of the expiry of the five-year limitation period.
 54
  
This problem was partially overcome by a landmark decision delivered by the Supreme Court (Plenary 
Session) in 2009.
55
 In this ruling the Supreme Court applied the contractual liability regime to State 
liability claims. This is contractual liability sui generis as it does not apply to a breach of contract but 
rather to the breach of statutory law.
56
 From a practical point of view, this regime seems much more 
consistent with the Francovich ruling than the tortious one as the claimant is not required to prove the 
negligent or intentional conduct of the state. In spite of that, the “theoretical foundations” supporting 
this revirement do not seem entirely convincing from the EU law perspective. Indeed, the Court 
recalled and reused the argument already put forward more than ten years before to dismiss State 
liability claims: state immunity. As the legislative action is always justified by political reasons, it 
follows that tort law, which presupposes the existence of an unlawful damage (non jure and contra 
jus) caused by an act or omission, contradicts, in its essence, the immunity principle. For this reason, 
only a liability system that does not entail such unlawful damage is compatible with State liability. 
Thus, the Supreme Court bridged the “past” and the “future”: the State immunity principle, founded 
on the constitutional theory of the two different and separated legal orders,
57
 has become the reason to 
justify the shift from the tortious to the contractual liability regime.  
Two years later the Supreme Court reviewed this argument and interpreted both private and 
constitutional law in line of the “Francovich doctrine”.
58
 In this case, concerning the transposition of 
Directives 1975/362/EEC and 1982/76/EEC, the Court confirmed that State liability must be treated in 
contract for the breach of the statutory obligation deriving from the Treaties. More notably, it pointed 
out that the fact that the claim is in contract (and not in tort) does not mean that the state’s omission is 
not unlawful in the Italian legal order. In addition to this, the Supreme Court had the occasion to 
discuss another crucial issue which had arisen after judgment n. 9147/2009. In the latter decision the 
Court did not provide any guidance as regards the date on which the limitation period starts to run 
(dies a quo). The relevant question was whether this period starts at the time when the state has 
correctly transposed the Directive, as the Court of Justice held in the Emmott case,
59
 or even before, 
namely the date on which the damage occurred, as the Court of Justice held in the Slagterier case.
60
 
The Supreme Court, ruling against its own precedent according to which the limitation period begins 
to run from the time that the damage occurred even if it is before the implementation of the 
Directive,
61
 held that this period cannot begin before the time the Directive is implemented in the 
national legal system. In fact, only from that time the individual is supposed to have effective 
knowledge of the Directive and will the time start to run for the purpose of statutory limitation periods.  
To conclude, in spite of the initial resistance to the Francovich judgment, Italian courts have finally 
developed a liability regime which is consistent with EU law. Accordingly, the individual must only 
prove the damage and the causal link between the failure to transpose a directive and the damage. 
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Moreover, insofar as the claim is in contract, the ten-year limitation period starts from the date on 
which a directive has been correctly transposed. Nevertheless, the limitation period still constitutes a 
decisive factor which limits the effects of the Francovich judgment. A clear demonstration of this is 
provided by the recent law 12.11.2011 n. 183 which establishes that the limitation period for State 
liability claims must be fixed at 5 years (Art. 4 (43) of the law).
62
 This provision, according to the 
Supreme Court, shall apply only to damages which occurred after the entry into force of the 
legislation. 
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The Netherlands 
Barend van Leeuwen (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics 
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Agriculture 4 
Asylum and immigration 1 
Employment 4 
Environmental protection 1 
Free movement of goods 2 
Social security 1 
State aid 1 
Taxation/Customs 6 
Total 21 
Court level Number of cases 
Last instance 7 
Court of Appeal 8 
First instance 6 
Total 21 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 9 
Business 9 
Collective (group of individuals, 
group of businesses, 
associations) 
3 
Total 21 
Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 4 
Claim dismissed 17 
Total 21 
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Reason for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
Procedural (incl. limitation 
period) 
5 
No breach of EU law 7 
No sufficiently serious breach 3 
No conferral of individual right 1 
No causal link 1 
Total 17 
Methodology 
The database which I used was www.rechtspraak.nl, which is a public database which is freely 
accessible. It is managed by the Dutch Court Service. The database includes reported cases from 2000 
onwards. Not all cases in the Netherlands are reported. The cases which are published on 
www.rechtspraak.nl are already a selection. 
I searched for Francovich cases up to 31 December 2013. The aim was to search for relevant cases in 
which Francovich liability was discussed as a real possibility. The following search terms were used: 
1. Francovich 
2. Factortame 
3. Brasserie du Pecheur 
4. Köbler 
5. Sufficiently serious breach (“voldoende gekwalificeerde schending”) 
6. Breach of Community Law (“schending van het gemeenschapsrecht”) 
The criterion of sufficiently serious breach was particularly helpful to identify cases in which 
Francovich liability was considered as a real possibility. A total of 21 relevant cases were identified.  
In 17 of them the claim for Francovich liability was dismissed, while in 4 the claim was successful.  
Context 
Dutch law does not have a statutory or constitutional provision about the conditions under which the 
State is liable to pay damages for harm caused by it. As a result, State liability has been developed  
by analogy with the legislative provision on civil liability for an unlawful act (Article 6:162 BW). Five 
conditions can be identified. First of all, there must have been an unlawful act by the State.  
The adoption of legislation can be unlawful. Secondly, this unlawful act must be attributable to the 
State. Thirdly, the rule or norm which has allegedly been breached must have been intended to provide 
protection to the party which is bringing the claim (“relativiteitsbeginsel”). Fourthly, there must have 
been a causal connection between the breach and the damage which has been suffered. Finally,  
the claimant must have suffered damage. 
It is clear that the conditions for State liability under Dutch law are relatively similar to those under 
EU law. However, the most important difference is that there is no requirement of a sufficiently 
serious breach. Dutch law only requires an unlawful act. Therefore, it would seem that  
the requirements under Dutch law are more favourable than under EU law. On that basis, one would 
assume that State liability claims would normally be brought under national law and that there  
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would be few Francovich cases. The relationship between national State liability law and State 
liability under EU law has recently been discussed by the Court of Appeal of The Hague and will be 
analysed below. 
Narrative 
In total, twenty-one relevant cases were found. Most of the cases were brought in the field of taxation. 
In these cases, Francovich State liability was usually not the main claim. Another area of law in which 
there were a significant amount of cases was agriculture. Francovich State liability was claimed in all 
levels of court – seven cases were last instance cases (not only the Supreme Court, but also the 
specialised College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven tribunal, which is the court of last instance for a 
number of areas within the scope of EU law), eight claims were in the Court of Appeal and six cases 
were first instance cases in the High Court. Relatively few cases were collective actions, while the 
number of cases brought by individuals and business was similar (nine).  
Four of the cases were successful, although it should be noted that on appeal in two of the cases the 
Court of Appeal held that because the state was liable under national law criteria, there was no need to 
discuss the Francovich criteria. All successful cases were brought in the same High Court and were 
about the same issue. This could indicate that lower courts are more willing to award damages on the 
basis of the Francovich criteria, but there is insufficient evidence for this claim to be convincing. Of 
the seventeen cases in which the Francovich claim was unsuccessful, in seven cases this was because 
the court found that there had not been a breach of EU law. Five cases were dismissed because of 
procedural reasons. This could be because the claims had been brought after the limitation period had 
expired, or because they were brought in the wrong kind of court. Because State liability was 
developed out of civil liability, administrative courts or tribunals do not have jurisdiction to award 
Francovich damages, for which separate proceedings have to be brought in the civil courts. In seven 
cases – including the four successful cases – the courts engaged in a discussion of whether a breach of 
EU law was sufficiently serious. 
Analysis 
The relationship between State liability under national law and State liability under EU law 
The four successful cases were all first instance judgments decided by the High Court of The Hague – 
three of them by the same judge. The judgments follow the same structure and are more or less 
identical. They are about the right to paid annual leave of employees who were on sick leave. The 
right to paid annual leave is laid down in Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC. The question was whether 
employees who were on sick leave were also entitled to paid annual leave. Dutch legislation provided 
that this was not the case. However, after the judgment of the ECJ in Schultz-Hoff in 2009 the 
legislation was amended. The claimants argued that the Dutch legislation should already have been 
amended after the judgment of the CJEU in Bectu in 2001. They submitted that the failure of the 
Dutch State to amend the legislation in a reasonable time period after the judgment should result in 
State liability. The discussion of the conditions of liability will be analysed below. The High Court 
went through all three Francovich criteria and decided that the Dutch State was liable. The State 
appealed and all cases came before the Court of Appeal of The Hague. There was also a cross-appeal 
by the claimants who argued that the conditions of liability under national law should have been 
applied. The Francovich conditions were only minimum criteria and it ought to be possible for 
national law to apply criteria which were more favourable to claimants. Dutch national law was more 
favourable. The simple adoption of legislation which was incompatible with EU law constituted an 
unlawful act which entitled the claimants to claim damages. The State argued that the adoption of 
legislation could not give rise to a claim of damages since it did not constitute an unlawful act.  
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Although the incompatibility of the legislation could give rise to the non-application of the 
incompatible legislation, as a matter of Dutch law it did not follow that there should be a private law 
remedy for the claimants. Two of the appeals were decided in 2013, while two other cases were 
decided in 2014 and could not be included. 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but allowed the cross-appeal of the claimants. It held that 
the criteria under Dutch law were more favourable and that there was no need to assess the case on the 
basis of the Francovich criteria. This is the first such decision of a Dutch court and it would mean that 
the Francovich criteria have become more or less redundant. Nevertheless, there could still be areas in 
which the Francovich criteria could be applied, such as in cases of an erroneous interpretation of EU 
law by national courts (Köbler). Moreover, there could be other areas in which Francovich liability 
still has something to add to national law. However, in general, it would seem that national law 
provides a more favourable route to claimants. The judgments of the Court of Appeal could result in 
more State liability claims for breaches of EU law. 
The interpretation of the criterion of “sufficiently serious breach” by Dutch courts 
There were a number of cases in which the courts discussed in what circumstances a breach of EU law 
could be considered to be sufficiently serious for the purposes of State liability. The series of cases 
already described above provide a good example. The starting point of the court in those cases was 
that this was not a case of non-implementation, but one of an erroneous interpretation  
and implementation of the Directive. In such cases, the state would be liable if it had gravely and 
manifestly disregarded the limits of its discretion. The answer to that question depended on the clarity 
of the relevant provision of EU law. In Bectu, a judgment delivered in 2001, the CJEU had already 
explained how Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 had to be interpreted. After this judgment, it was no 
longer possible for the Dutch State to interpret Article 7 in the way that it did. Although the State  
was given a reasonable period to amend the legislation to comply with the requirements of EU law, 
this period had been well exceeded. As a result, the breach of EU law was sufficiently serious  
and was based on the omission of the Dutch State to amend the legislation after the CJEU’s judgment. 
In another case, the claimant was a Ukrainian national who wanted to bring her husband to the 
Netherlands under the Family Reunification Directive. Leave to remain in the Netherlands was refused 
by the Ministry. After the judgment of the CJEU in Chakroun in 2010, the relevant Dutch legislation 
was amended. The claimant brought an action for State liability and argued that by dismissing the 
application the Ministry had intentionally acted in breach of EU law. The High Court of the Hague 
held that the breach of EU law had not been sufficiently serious. It was not until the judgment of the 
CJEU in Chakroun that the correct interpretation of the Family Reunification Directive had become 
clear. The fact that the Raad van State (the highest court for certain administrative law matters) had 
already expressed doubts about the compatibility of the Dutch legislation with EU law in 2004 was not 
sufficient for the breach to be sufficiently serious – on the contrary, it confirmed that there were 
doubts about the correct interpretation. 
Finally, in a case decided by the Court of Appeal of Arnhem, the claimant was a Dutch citizen who 
lived in England and had appealed the imposition of a tax levy by the Ministry. The claimant claimed 
that a particular levy, including a requirement of a surety, breached Article 43 EC. The case was 
referred to the CJEU which held that the Dutch taxation system, which provided for a particular levy 
in the claimant’s situation, breached Article 43 EC. When the case returned to the Court of Appeal, it 
held that the breach was not sufficiently serious. The Court of Appeal held that  
“it cannot be said that the Netherlands has manifestly and gravely breached that obligation  
by incorporating in the legislation in question a compulsory surety to be able to get an extension to pay 
the imposed tax. The fact that certain Members of Parliament expressed doubts about the compatibility 
of the legislation in question with EC law when the legislation was adopted does not result in a different  
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conclusion. The Court further notes that the Dutch system has not been found to be obstructive in its 
entirely by the ECJ, but only in so far as it imposed the requirement of a compulsory surety to get an 
extension of payment of the imposed tax, and in so far as it did not take into account possible 
deductions in value which might have taken place after the departure at the moment of actual 
alienation”.  
It also added that the wording of Article 43 EC was not clear and that there was a significant amount 
of disagreement in the academic literature.  
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Poland 
Przemysław Pałka (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics  
Two relevant cases were found, based on the same legal and similar factual background 
1. Area of law: 2 Financial services (MIFID I&II) 
2. Court level: 1 Court of Appeals, 1 Supreme Court 
3. Type of claimant: 2 Business 
4. Outcome: 2 Unsuccessful 
5. Reason for dismissal of claim: 2 Lack of causation 
Methodology 
I conducted a thorough research of three databases, two public and one commercial. Since only two 
cases were found, I have re-done it, with a significantly higher number of search terms. Francovich 
liability, in a more flexible form (not-requiring the breach to be serious), has been internalized into the 
Polish Civil Code, as a part of State (State Treasury’s) liability. It is, therefore, possible that 
Francovich cases have been adjudicated without mentioning any CJEU case-law. That is why I also 
use terms specific for this type of liability in the national system. In this short section, databases and 
the justification for their choice are indicated, and list of all the search terms used in each of them 
listed (together with results) in the tables below. 
Databases searched 
Public databases 
a) Portal Orzeczeń Sądów Powszechnych (Portal of  the Common Courts’ Judgments)  
Available at: http://orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl/ (Polish only) 
Public database, run by the Ministry of Justice (pol. Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości), containing 
judgments of the district courts (pol. sąd rejonowy), the regional courts (pol. sąd okręgowy) and the 
appellate courts (pol. sąd apelacyjny).  
Justification of choice of the database: Common courts in Poland (pol. sądy powszechne) adjudicate 
in all the types of cases, apart from administrative cases and military cases. Any case regarding 
liability, particularly State liability, would be adjudicated by a common court. This database contains 
all the published judgments of the common courts in Poland. 
b) Baza Orzeczeń Sądu Najwyższego (Database of the Supreme Court’s Judgements) 
Available at: www.sn.pl/orzecznictwo (Search option and judgments available in Polish only). 
Public database, run by the Supreme Court (pol. Sąd Najwyższy), containing all the published 
judgments of the Supreme Court. 
Justification of choice of the database: Supreme Court in Poland adjudicates as the court of cassation, 
when the judgment of the court of second instance is claimed unlawful in terms of substance or 
procedure. Together with the previous database, if any Francovich judgment has been published, it 
would have to be either in one or another. 
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Private databases 
a) LexPolonica 
Available at: http://lponline.lexpolonica.pl (Polish only)  
Commercial database, run by LexisNexis, containing Polish legislation and judgments of Polish 
courts. One of the three biggest and most popular (next to Legalis by C.H. Beck  and Lex by 
Wolters Kluwer) commercial legal databases in Poland, the only one available at the EUI. 
Justification of the choice of the database: It is legally and technically impossible for this database 
to contain any judgment not present in the previous two. However, I decided to use it, since the 
key-words and tags used in it might vary, therefore there was a chance I could find judgment that I 
would have missed in the previous ones. 
Public databases search both in the text itself and by key-words. Since it is possible that a Francovich 
case is adjudicated without mentioning any CJEU case, just on national law grounds, in the public 
databases I also used phrases characteristic for this type of liability. Below, I indicate how many 
judgments labelled with particular tags were found (‘found judgments’) and then perform content 
analysis to indicate how many of them have actually been about Francovich-like liability (‘Francovich 
judgments’). There were only two and they often appeared in different searches.  
Context 
Historically, State liability is a young phenomenon in Polish private law, institutionalised only during 
the process of democratisation and Europeanisation after 1989. In the previous version of the Civil 
Code, civil liability of the state, especially of the legislature, was non-existent and as a concept almost 
unanimously contested in the doctrine. This has changed directly under the inspiration of the CJEU 
case law
63
.  
Civil liability of the State was confirmed and codified in art. 417 of the Polish Civil Code (introducing 
civil liability of the State Treasury for losses caused by public authorities) and art. 417
1
, introducing 
specific regimes of liability, which states as follows (translation is mine, P.P.): 
Art. 417
1
 
§ 1. If the loss has been caused by a legal act, remedies can be claimed after this act had been proven 
contrary to the Constitution, a ratified international agreement or an act of the Parliament, in the proper 
proceedings. 
§ 2. If the loss has been caused by a final judgment or a final administrative decision, remedies can be 
claimed after this judgment or decision had been declared unlawful in the proper proceedings, unless 
specific provisions state otherwise. This applies as well to situations when the final judgment or the 
final decision has been based on an act contrary to the Constitution, a ratified international agreement or 
an act of the Parliament. 
§ 3. If the loss has been caused by not issuing a judgment or a decision, when there exists a legal 
obligation to issue them, remedies can be claimed after unlawfulness of the lack of issuance had been 
proven in proper proceedings, unless specific provision state otherwise. 
§ 4. If the loss has been caused by not issuing a legal act, when there exists a legal obligation of its 
issuance, unlawfulness of this non-enactment is stated by the court recognizing the case for damages. 
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This article, read together with the general delict clause in art. 415 (Whoever has culpably caused 
another person a loss, is obliged to repair it), provides for State liability for damages caused by the 
legislature, administration and judicature – both for unlawful acts and failures to act. This also 
comprises Francovich liability, and does so in a more flexible way, since no ‘serious breech’ is needed. 
This loosens the requirements for Francovich liability, but at the same time ‘internalises’ this type of 
liability fully into national law
64
. 
Narrative 
I managed to find two Francovich cases – both related to Poland’s delay in transposition of the MIFID 
directives; both claimed by business actors; both unsuccessful because of the lack of causation. One 
was decided by the Court of Appeals, one by the Supreme Court. In both cases State liability was 
considered a serious option. 
Analysis 
As noted above, both cases were concerned with the same legal question. In both cases, the courts 
seemed ready to grant Francovich liability (since it was internalised into the Polish Civil Code), but in 
both cases they found a lack of causation between the State’s delay in transposing the MIFID 
Directives and the losses suffered. In one case, the company had already been engaging in very risky 
operations regardless of any information about the risk for a long time; in the other one the transaction 
concluded with the bank would be and was lawful under the MIFID regime). 
Two cases is not many for 10 years. However, a number of observations can be made. 
Polish courts, especially the Supreme Court, often analyse CJEU judgments, in particular Köbler, 
while adjudicating in purely national cases, even when they do not involve EU law. This might be due 
to the fact that the very idea of State liability was introduced together with the obligation to internalise 
Francovich liability. 
There was quite a significant amount of cases where private parties tried to invoke the horizontal 
direct effect of directives, e.g. by suing an employer or a bank, instead of the state. It might take time 
for our practitioners to understand the whole EU law regime. One of the two cases I managed to find 
does not refer to any CJEU judgment – it is based entirely on national law. That is why I decided to 
use so many different search terms. 
 
  
                                                     
64
 Bieniek, Gerard, Czyny niedozwolone (art. 415-449 KC); [w:] Bieniek, Gerard; Ciepla, Helena (…) Komentarz 
do Kodeksu cywilnego. Księga trzecia. Zobowiązania tom I, LexisNexis, Warszawa 2011 [[Commentary to 
Polish Civil Code]] 
The Application of Francovich State Liability by National Courts 
38 
Spain 
Leticia Díez Sánchez (PhD Researcher, European University Institute) 
Statistics 
  
Area of law Number of cases 
Agriculture   
Asylum and immigration   
Employment  4 
Environmental protection   
Free movement of goods  4 
Social security  4 
State aid   
Taxation  129 
Consumer protection  2 
Total  143 
 Court level Number of cases 
Last instance  133 
Court of Appeal  10 
First instance   
Total  143 
  
Most of cases in the taxation field relate to VAT; only 3 of them were litigation in other fields within 
the taxation category.  
 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual  11 
Business  116 
Collective   16 
Total  143 
Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful  130 
Claim dismissed  13 
Total  143 
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Reason for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
Procedural (incl. limitation 
period)  
~ 1 (see Case 127 regarding 
some of the claimants)  
No breach of EU law  1 
No sufficiently serious breach  5 
No conferral of individual right  3 
No causal link  3 
Total 12  + ~ 1 
 
The term “Collective” included associations, foundations and a city council. Public businesses are 
marked as “Business*” and explained afterwards. In some of the VAT cases the claimant is an 
individual – but a link to a commercial activity is supposed in the context.  
Methodology 
I used the Spanish database “Aranzadi” to search for case-law. ‘Aranzadi’ gathers all the cases from 
lower and higher judicial instances shortly after they have been delivered. I examined all judgments 
available during the period 1
st
 January 2000 to 31
st
 December 2013.  
I inserted “Francovich” in the field “Text” – which produced all the judicial decisions, in lower and 
higher courts, where Francovich had been mentioned either by the parties or by the Court. This gave 
864 results. In order to reduce the search results to those relevant for the project, the legal term 
“Pecuniary responsibility of the Public Administration” was selected from the list of legal terms in the 
field “Voices” (Voces).    
In order to ensure that no relevant cases were missed, this search was repeated substituting “Köbler” 
for “Francovich”. This did not give any further results. The search was again repeated substituting 
“Factortame” for “Francovich”. On this occasion, one more relevant case was found and added to the 
case sheets.  
In total, 153 cases were found using these search techniques. A close reading showed that only 143 of 
them were relevant according to the methodology above.  By way of final note, introducing a legal 
term (“Pecuniary Responsibility of the Public Administration”) within the search results presents the 
risk of missing cases that had not been codified by Aranzadi under such legal term. In other words, it 
renders the search results dependant on a previous consistent codification by the database. While the 
possibility of mistake is very little, this could be taken into account in further research.   
Context 
The regime for State liability in Spain was traditionally based on strict liability. The conditions for this 
were (1) the existence of an economically quantifiable damage, (2) the authorship of the public 
administration (this was interpreted in a broad sense) and (3) a direct causal link between the actions 
of the administration and the damage.   
The model of liability developed by Francovich is not radically different, but Spanish legislation does 
not require the legislation in question to give rights to an individual or the damage to be sufficiently 
serious. It only requires that the individual in question has suffered a damage that she did not have the 
obligation to bear. What Francovich has added to the Spanish legal system is the obligation to 
assimilate damages suffered by unconstitutional actions to those suffered by non-implementation or 
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wrong implementation of directives (no need to exhaust previous administrative actions, the 
possibility to request damages directly through judicial procedures). Previously, breaches of EU law 
could be brought to courts within the same formal requirements as those caused by breaches of 
ordinary Spanish legislation (initial request of damages through administrative procedures within the 
time-limits established by the relevant legislation on the matter).  
Narrative 
143 relevant cases were found, out of which 130 were successful. A disproportionate number of cases 
(129) belong to the field of taxation. The 126 tax cases originated in a breach of the Sixth Directive 
(on a common system of VAT tax) that triggered litigation which came to an end after the CJEU held 
that Spain had breached the Directive. Although the factual background to most of these cases is 
nearly identical, claims for pecuniary responsibility were made individually - hence the large number 
of cases with similar judicial reasoning.  
In addition to the “VAT saga”, three other cases in the field of tax law were also successful, two of 
them on the basis of Directive 69/335/EC concerning indirect taxes on the raising of capital and 
another one on the basis of income tax for non-residents. In additional, four cases were brought in the 
field of free movement, of which one was successful. Four cases were brought in the field of 
employment: two unsuccessful, regarding the Working Time Directive; and two regarding redundancy 
payments (one of which was successfully litigated). Four unsuccessful claims were raised in the field 
of social security (pensions). Finally, one case related to consumer protection was successful and 
another one unsuccessful.  
In terms of the type of claimants, the great majority (116) of the cases were initiated by businesses. 
Although 11 cases were initiated by individuals, the real number of actions brought by individuals 
could be smaller as within the VAT saga a link with commercial activity is to be supposed. The 
remaining 16 cases were brought by collective actors (this includes associations, foundations and a 
city council). It is interesting that with regard to the VAT saga, some of the claimants were public or 
semi-public bodies. This is the case because Spain is a decentralised polity (towards regions and 
municipalities), yet VAT is paid to the central government. Hence, some of the cases illustrate an 
interesting conflict not between the public and the private sphere, but between different levels of 
government. 
133 of the judgments found were by a court of last instance. However, most of the cases at last 
instance did not stem from a prior appeal but from an appeal of administrative acts – pecuniary 
responsibility from the Administration was requested through a special administrative procedure. 
Should the administrative resolution be appealed, these appeals go directly to a higher court. The 
remaining 10 cases were before a Court of Appeal.  
The absence of a sufficiently serious breach was the main reason for dismissal (it was claimed in 5 
cases), most remarkably in cases of flagrant violation of the Working Time Directive. Lack of 
conferral of a right was alleged by the Spanish Courts in 3 cases, and the lack of causality was put 
forward in other 3 cases. In one of the successful cases (Alain F, #127) some of the claimants were not 
awarded compensation for procedural reasons (having exceeded the time period for lodging a legal 
action after the damage had been caused). Lastly, in Forum Filatélico (#143) the Court considered that 
the case was outside the scope of the relevant EU legislation on the matter.   
Analysis 
The overall picture of Spain is one of compliance with the Francovich criteria for the award of 
damages: 130 out of 143 actions were successful. However, these data need some qualification.  
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Previous CJEU judgments 
While previous judgments of the CJEU that found Spain in breach of EU law are not needed per Alain 
F. (Case #127 in the casesheets) or per Eusebio Ramón (Case #130), such decisions were relevant in 
the VAT saga (cases #1 to #126), in Dekan (Case #139), in Canal Satélite Digital (#141) and in SAGE 
(#142).  As to the VAT saga, the CJEU first declared that Spanish legislation was against the Sixth 
Council Directive (C-204/03) and, later, required that Spanish authorities allow requests for damages 
under EU law to be dealt with in the same manner as those emanating from unconstitutional acts 
(C118/08).  In Dekan, SAGE and Canal Satélite Digital, a previous decision of the CJEU that held 
Spain had acted contrary to EU law, was of crucial importance in order to establish a sufficiently 
serious breach.  
It is noted in this regard that the lack of a condemnatory judgment by the CJEU was presented by the 
Supreme Court as evidence against the existence of a sufficiently serious breach in Biostab (Case 
#136). Closely related to this claim is that of denying a sufficiently serious breach on the basis that the 
Commission had not started judicial proceedings against Spain (Case D. Eulogio, #138). In addition, 
the fact that the CJEU did not include Laboratorios Tegor within a list of companies affected by a 
Spanish breach of EU law lead the Supreme Court to reject this company’s claim for damages (Case 
#137).  
Sufficiently serious breach 
EU law does not lead to damages in cases related to the Working Time Directive, for the breach is not 
considered by the Spanish Courts to be sufficiently serious (Cases #129 Doña Olga, #128 Cuerpos 
Facultativos) because of the ambiguous interpretation that could be given to the Directive. It seems 
paradoxical that if the same case had been decided exclusively under domestic law, damages would 
have most likely been awarded as the claimant would not have needed to prove the seriousness of the 
damage. Similarly, the court would not have had to assess the margin of appreciation of the 
administration.   
The strategic use of Francovich 
As has been mentioned, the VAT saga provides evidence that not only companies pursue a remedy 
against the actions of the public administration, but that public administrations of other territorial 
entities within Spain also bring Francovich actions. This opens up an interesting route for further 
research: the strategic use of Francovich by different power centres in decentralised polities.  
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The United Kingdom 
Rónán Condon and Barend van Leeuwen (PhD Researchers, European University Institute) 
Statistics  
 
Area of law Number of cases 
Agriculture (including fishery) 3 
Asylum and immigration 3 
Employment 5 
Environmental protection 1 
Free movement of 
goods/services 
2 
Social security (Including 
Insurance) 
4 
State aid  
Taxation 3 
Free movement of persons 0 
Financial Services 1 
Copyright 2 
Right to Vote 1 
Total 25 
Court level Number of cases 
Last instance 3 
Court of Appeal 7 
First instance 15 
Total 25 
Type of claimant Number of cases 
Individual 10 
Business 4 
Collective (group of individuals, 
group of businesses, 
associations) 
11 
Total 25 
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Outcome Number of cases 
Claim successful 1 
Claim dismissed 24 
Total 25 
Reason for dismissal of claim Number of cases 
Procedural (incl. limitation 
period) 
3 
No breach of EU law 3 
No sufficiently serious breach 10 
No conferral of individual right 7 
No causal link 0 
Preliminary Reference 1 
Total 24 
Methodology 
We used both westlaw.co.uk and bailii.org to search for Francovich liability judgments. The main 
search terms used were, ‘State liability’, ‘sufficiently serious breach’, and ‘conferral of a right’. In 
addition, a number of leading cases were used as search terms, such as ‘Francovich’, ‘Brasserie du 
Pecheur’, ‘Köbler’, ‘Brinkmann’, ‘Factortame’ and so on. From an initial find of over 80 judgments, 
these were filtered in accordance with our ‘relevance’ requirement. Other cases were deemed relevant 
in addition to the discussion of these points e.g. if limitations periods were discussed. This means that 
there is an average of two cases per year which reach High Court-level at least. 
Context 
The common law of England and Wales has traditionally recognised no general principle of State 
liability. A claimant was required to argue on the basis of breach of statutory duty or the common law 
duty of care. Policy arguments, and the theory of parliamentary sovereignty tend to militate against 
recovery. Otherwise, ordinary tort law causes of action are applicable but normally if the claim is 
pursued against individual public officials, the claim is required to fit within ordinary torts such as 
defamation, assault and so on. The only distinctively public tort is misfeasance in public office, which 
requires proof of mala fides on behalf of a public official. It appears that the requirement of mala fides 
has been relaxed in recent years but this remains a developing area of law. In consequence, the 
concept of a general claim against the state for its acts or omissions is novel in an English law context. 
Refraction: Breach of statutory duty sui generis  
The Factortame-saga has cast a shadow over the jurisprudence of the Superior courts. It is notable that 
when Factortame ‘came home’ in Factortame VI. HHJ Toulmin categorised Francovich as a breach of 
statutory duty sui generis. This rather unhelpful epithet seems to elide two distinct categories of 
recovery. The former is based on construing the ‘intention of Parliament’ which rests on the theory of 
parliamentary sovereignty and is coloured in its development by policy factors, and the latter on the 
entirely different European basis for recovery; or as Giliker refers to Francovich, the ‘Eurotort’.  In 
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Factortame VI the relevant question was whether Francovich could be treated as akin to national law 
for the purposes of time limitations in tort.  
Narrative 
To date our research has indicated that there have been 25 decisions of the Superior Courts on in 
which Francovich was a relevant factor. In all but one of these cases the claimant did not succeed in 
his claim. Most of the claims relate to social security (8), and other important categories of claims 
include taxation (4), and more recently immigration and asylum (4). 
In any case concerning Framework Directives (e.g. Sayers v Cambridgeshire CoCo [2006] EWHC 
2029) the Framework Directive was considered too imprecise to give rise to liability. 
The Courts are not shy to refer cases to the CJEU, although they have refused references on a number 
of occasions where perhaps it was required (Alderson, Three Rivers). 
Analysis 
Conferral of a right 
It appears that the analogy with breach of statutory duty which flows from the cloudy formulation of 
the tort in the High Court seems to reappear in Three Rivers and subsequent judgments.  In Three 
Rivers, a case in which the claimants sought to impute a duty to supervise on the Bank of England 
resulting in liability for failure to do so adequately, the corollary of a right purportedly flowing from 
the relevant directive, the Court’s interpretation of conferral of a right is at the very least restrictive. In 
that case Lord Hope departed from the CJEU’s approach in Dillenkofer and distinguished between the 
primary purposes and secondary purposes of the Directive. If we recall, in Dillenkofer the CJEU 
reasoned that if a directive has more than one purpose this is not a sufficient reason to argue that rights 
were not intended to be conferred. The learned judge held that depositor protection was a secondary 
purpose of the Directive and therefore no rights were conferred on the claimants. He supported his 
interpretation of the Directive by reference to the fact that there was no express grant of rights on the 
face of the Directive and arguably eschewed a purposive approach.  
To an extent the House of Lords was vindicated in its approach by Paul. However, this narrow 
approach which searches for ‘express’ wording and ‘intention’ was applied in other areas which do not 
relate to banking regulation. In Poole this narrow approach was followed in the area of insurance.  In 
Millward v Oxfordshire CoCo the case concerned a claim for personal injuries pursuant to Council 
Directive 89/391. This Directive was implemented into UK law by the Management of Health and 
Safety at Work Regulations 1992. The Court obiter followed Lord Hope in Three Rivers in two 
respects. First, by adopting a test which posed the question of whether the conferral of a right was 
‘strictly necessary’.  Second, by an approach to statutory interpretation that seems more appropriate 
for determining whether there is a breach of statutory duty. In this regard, the Court considered that 
the Directive ‘...is aimed at imposing general obligations on employers, not at conferring rights on 
individuals.’  The Court cited Lord Hope’s approach with approval. To determine the aim of the 
Directive the approach followed was to narrowly focus on the express wording of the Directive at the 
apparent expense of its purpose. 
Therefore, our research to date indicates a tendency to use conferral of a right as a control mechanism. 
In numerical terms, 7 cases have been dismissed on this basis whereas 10 have been dismissed on the 
basis of an absence of a sufficiently serious breach. 
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Sufficiently serious breach 
It is notable that in commenting on Francovich the Court in Factortame V found that the concepts of 
conferral of a right and sufficiently serious breach were ‘familiar in the English law concept of tort.’  
At paragraph 91 the Court went further by stating that the determination of sufficiently serious breach 
was for national courts and not for the ECJ, because it was a matter of fact. It was acknowledged that 
the ‘sufficiently serious breach’ criterion is what makes this a ‘novel’ remedy from an English 
perspective. This is notable because although the determination of whether a breach is sufficiently 
serious ultimately is a matter to be determined by an analysis of the facts, the definition of the scope of 
the concept of sufficiently serious breach is not a matter of national law. Second, the CJEU’s approach 
often is ‘outcome’ based, and therefore the Factortame judgment seems, it is submitted, to arrogate 
more discretion to national law than what the CJEU had envisaged. 
In some cases, the Court will dismiss a claim by arguing that there is neither a right conferred nor a 
sufficiently serious breach of EU law. Hence, the narrow and perhaps refracted approach to conferral 
of a right tends to result in claims being dismissed before a detailed examination of the extent of 
discretion via the sufficiently serious breach condition can occur. However, in those cases in which the 
first condition is fulfilled the court has gone some way to expand on its understanding of sufficiently 
serious breach in recent case-law. 
In Barco v Thanet District Council the claimants were live animal exporters who claimed that the 
respondents by banning the use of their port for the purposes of export, violated article 35 of the 
Treaty, and that the ban constituted a sufficiently serious breach of EU law giving rise to Francovich 
liability. Briss J. accepted that there was a sufficiently serious breach of EU law, and held that there 
was a direct causal link between the imposition of an export ban and the losses suffered by the 
claimants.
65
 The approach to sufficiently serious breach undertaken relied heavily on Factortame V 
citing Lord Clyde’s judgment, in particular. The question was one of ‘fact and circumstance’ and a 
question of the appropriate use of discretion. The judgment involved a detailed examination of the 
conduct of the respondent, and found that his conduct was disproportionate to the ends to be achieved. 
It would appear that Briss J. was of the view that a ban on the basis of animal welfare was a pretext – 
its real basis being a moral and political judgment premised on animal welfare concerns. This appears 
to be akin to stating that the respondent acted in bad faith, although this was not explicitly stated in the 
judgment. As such, Briss J. found a sufficiently serious breach of EU law. 
Recently, in McGouch v UK, a case concerning the voting rights of prisoners, the Supreme Court 
examined the sufficiently serious breach criterion – albeit obiter. In this case the claimants failed to 
show that a right was conferred on them. Thus, after rehearsing the Brasserie test, the Court held that 
in light of the unsettled case-law it was arguable that there was no sufficiently serious breach. Further 
the Court made the following remark: 
Since the relevant United Kingdom authority is here Parliament in enacting and continuing in force the 
relevant legislation, an assessment of some of these matters (particularly whether the infringement was 
intentional or voluntary, excusable or inexcusable) may threaten conflict with the constitutional 
principle enshrined in the Bill of Rights 1688 that domestic courts in the United Kingdom ought not to 
‘impeach or question’ proceedings in Parliament.  
In order to avoid this difficult constitutional question the Court suggested approaching the question 
‘on an objective basis, without regard to what has actually happened or been said in Parliament.’  This 
would, it is argued, appear to be a well-intentioned but nevertheless questionable interpretation of the 
test for Francovich liability by moulding it to fit national constitutional law.  
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In Negassi v Home Dept. the Court of Appeal dealt extensively with the sufficiently serious breach 
test.  On the facts, the Secretary of State refused the claimant, an asylum seeker, the right to work on 
an erroneous interpretation of Article 11, Council Directive 2003/9/EC. Kay LJ referred the 
‘multifactorial test’ for the determination of whether the breach in question was sufficiently serious. 
Kay LJ, following Lord Clyde in Factortame V, stated that in the end this test is a matter of fact and 
circumstance.  For the stake of clarity the multifactorial test is a rehearsal of the various factors 
enumerated by the Court in Brasserie when examining whether a breach is sufficiently serious. These 
include, inter alia, the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the degree of excusability of an error 
of law, the existence of any relevant CJEU judgment on point, and the voluntariness or otherwise of 
the act/omission of the infringer of the right. These are factors aimed at determining whether a breach 
was manifest in circumstances in which European law leaves discretion to the national legislature as to 
how to implement European law, and should be distinguished from non-implementation cases in 
which non-implementation of European law constitutes a sufficiently serious breach per se.
66
 The 
national court’s task is then to weigh these factors in a fact-sensitive manner. In the end the Court 
found that the factors for and against recovery were finely balanced but that the basis of the breach 
was a misunderstanding of new provisions of EU law which the Court found not to be ‘cynical or 
egregious’.  It is arguable that this is to add to the test a new and more exacting condition i.e. cynicism 
and egregiousness in cases of misapplication of EU law. It could be argued that this is closer to the 
English tort of misfeasance in public office as it implies a degree of dishonesty (cynical). Therefore, 
taking McGouch and Negrassi as indicative, a notable feature of these more recent claims is that they 
attempt to tie Francovich liability to the issue of fundamental rights protection i.e. outside traditional 
economic torts. These claims were ultimately unsuccessful for the reasons explained above. 
The Negrassi test was applied to sufficiently serious breach in a different context in Recall v Secretary 
for State for Media, Culture and Sport. The claim concerned the use of ‘GSM Gateways’ technology 
in the telecoms industry. The Ministry refused to allow its use, and the claimants alleged damages 
amounting to £415 million. Rose J. (HC) decided, in the absence of a CJEU judgment on this point, 
that the public security justification relied on by the state was unjustified and outside its meaning in 
the relevant directive. She held on the basis of the test in Poole, cited above, that a right had been 
conferred on the claimants. However, Rose J. held that the breach of EU law had not been sufficiently 
serious. In so doing, Rose J. applied the multifactorial test in Negrassi, finding in particular that the 
Ministry weighed the arguments for public security and did not approach the matter with a closed 
mind.
67
 The error of law was held to be excusable, and not an ‘egregious error’. Again, the sufficiently 
serious test was applied in a highly fact-sensitive manner and seemed to be closely based on the bona 
fides, or otherwise, of the relevant Governmental department.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, it appears that in the United Kingdom a narrow reading of ‘conferral of a right’ has led 
to muted reception to Francovich liability. In those judgments which have treated ‘sufficiently serious 
breach’ the claimants have been mostly unsuccessful. In recent years the courts appear more willing to 
examine the sufficiently serious breach question. However, in most of the cases they ultimately 
dismiss the claim. An exception to this approach is Barco, in which the conditions for a sufficiently 
serious breach were held to be fulfilled. However, the factual circumstances were such that the breach 
could be characterised as mala fides on the part of the respondents. On the facts, however, the 
Francovich remedy filled a remedial gap.  
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Conclusions 
Rónán Condon and Barend van Leeuwen (PhD Researchers, European University Institute) 
Summary of findings 
The research undertaken indicates that there is no single clear pattern as to the relevant legal issues 
that have arisen with regard to how national law interacts with Francovich liability. This is, perhaps, 
to be expected since Francovich liability requires only minimum harmonisation of liability, and 
Member State courts may, if they so choose, go beyond the minimum conditions of liability to impose 
more exacting standards on Member States in light of their own legal traditions of State liability. A 
second reason why we might not expect that the relevant legal issues are similar in each jurisdiction 
devolves from the very difference in legal tradition and institutional structure that raises different 
legally relevant questions in each jurisdiction. We propose to briefly point to the different legal issues 
raised before indicating the subject-matter at issue, and finally, examining the treatment of a specific 
condition of liability, namely, ‘sufficiently serious breach’. The latter aims to examine how national 
courts have treated the most distinctive condition of liability with a view to explore, at least in a 
preliminary manner, the patterns which have developed at national level, and to speculate as to the 
reasons why they have developed. 
Main legal issues 
In the common law jurisdictions, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the courts have mainly grappled 
with the conditions of liability. In the United Kingdom, the courts focus on the first and second 
condition of liability, conferral of a right and sufficiently serious breach. In Ireland, by contrast, the 
emphasis is placed on causation mainly as a means to deny recovery. The Irish High Court, in 
particular, has on occasion found ways to avoid a discussion of Francovich liability by referring to 
national law remedies instead. In Poland, the courts have invoked causation to deny recovery, 
although given the paucity of judgments it is difficult to extrapolate links to the Irish approach. 
 In France, the courts have also concentrated on the question of causation. This is perhaps unsurprising 
because in French national law causation is the main control mechanism used by the courts – the 
question of whether a legal bond exists being an easier hurdle to surmount. In Italy, the question of 
Francovich liability has developed according to the more general debate about the primacy of 
European law. At first, the Court’s attitude towards recovery can be characterised as recalcitrant. Over 
time, however, the Court has come to re-fashion its substantive law to make recovery more than a 
hypothetical possibility by, in particular, re-framing the basis of recovery to extend time-limits. This 
approach is not dissimilar to that taken in Finland, in which the courts initially were reluctant to award 
recovery relying on a number of national procedural and substantive bars that penalised claimants who 
brought Francovich claims based on national rules which limit recovery against public authorities. 
However, in recent years this approach has been relaxed, and a number of cases are pending before the 
courts. Nevertheless, as the Finland report indicates, there remain a number of procedural bars that 
inhibit recovery. 
The Dutch courts now appear to have gone beyond the minimum conditions of liability by dispensing 
with the requirement of sufficiently serious breach, and allow recovery more liberally, at least in 
theory, than most other jurisdictions. In Spain, by contrast, and notwithstanding the high number of 
successful claims deriving from the Spanish State’s non-implementation of the Sixth Directive on 
VAT, the treatment of domestic claims against the state appears to be more favourable than those 
under the head of Francovich liability. This is questionable from an equivalence perspective, a theme 
that is developed below with regard to the condition of sufficiently serious breach. 
In Germany, the courts have awarded damages in a considerable number of cases on foot of the Fuss 
judgment of the CJEU. However, it is submitted that the courts have followed a minimalist approach 
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to Francovich liability. The courts seem unwilling to find a sufficiently serious breach in the absence 
of a prior judgment of the CJEU holding the state in breach of EU law.  
Finally, in Greece the courts seem to have particular difficulty with implementing the Köbler 
judgment. In those cases not involving the liability of the judicial branch of government, the Greek 
courts appear willing to award recovery. 
The relationship between State liability under national law and State liability under EU law 
One of the important themes of the national reports is the relationship between State liability under 
national law and State liability under EU law. Does Francovich State liability remain an autonomous 
remedy at the national level or is it incorporated in or adopted by national State liability law? The 
alternative is that given the flexibility inherent in the sufficiently serious breach condition, which is 
ultimately a question of the proper use of discretionary power, states might fall back on their national 
categories of recovery, going below what is minimally required by the remedy. 
It is clear that in most Member States Francovich State liability remains a separate and isolated 
remedy. Judges have had difficulties to characterise the remedy and have used expressions such as ‘sui 
generis’ to illustrate the self-standing character of the conditions for State liability under EU law.
68
 
The need to keep Francovich State liability a separate remedy has been particularly visible in Member 
States with less developed systems for State liability under national law, such as the United Kingdom 
and Ireland. However, in Member States in which State liability was already before the incursion of 
EU law relatively well-developed, such as France, it is claimed that Francovich has been silently 
adopted without too much reference to the precise requirements imposed by EU law.
69
 France is a 
particularly interesting example, because it has separate liability regimes for different kinds of State 
acts. Each of these regimes has slightly different conditions for liability. The question then becomes 
how Francovich State liability is integrated in each of these regimes. However, we note that although 
certain jurisdictions such as France or Greece traditionally have a more developed form of State 
liability, this does not imply that these jurisdictions integrate Francovich liability unproblematically. 
For example, in Greece, a jurisdiction which borrows heavily from French law, it is clear that the 
courts often elide Francovich liability and recovery under article 105 of the Greek Civil Code. Now, 
one might expect that this means that State liability is, therefore, more effective because equivalent 
national remedies exist. This is not, however, necessarily the case because a similar tendency to that 
evidenced in common law jurisdictions, which fits State liability into the national State liability 
regime, is evident. In Greece, the possibility of a Köbler-type claim was dismissed as a matter of 
principle, which is clearly contrary to the Francovich doctrine as developed by the CJEU. This is 
notwithstanding the fact that recovery is general is more easily obtained in situations in which 
recovery would be available in national law for unlawful acts of the state. 
It is claimed, therefore, on the basis of the research conducted, that although the courts formally 
recognise the separate and autonomous nature of Francovich liability, in practice, the interpretation of 
the conditions of liability evidences a tendency to interpret Francovich in accordance with pre-existing 
national approaches to recovery against the state. By this approach, we intend to use ‘sufficiently 
serious breach’ as an example or a heuristic with which to probe the degree to which Francovich has 
been integrated into the national laws of the Member States surveyed. Therefore, for the purposes of 
our conclusions we will examine the manner in which the condition of sufficiently serious breach has 
been integrated in a number of the jurisdictions surveyed to give a non-exhaustive account of this 
process. We hope to examine these findings more exhaustively at a later point; for now, our 
conclusions are by way of provisional findings only. 
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Before turning to the question of sufficiently serious breach, we propose to outline the areas in which 
Francovich claims have been brought and the success rate of claimants.  
The areas of law in which Francovich claims have been brought and the success rate 
In general, it has proven difficult to identify clear patterns or similarities across the Member States in 
the areas of law in which Francovich claims have been brought and the areas of law in which these 
claims have been most successful. However, two observations can be made. First of all, a significant 
number of cases have been brought in the area of employment law and social security. This is also the 
area which appears to have the highest success rate. Secondly, there have also been a high number of 
cases in the field of taxation and VAT. It will be remembered that the original Francovich case was an 
employment law case which concerned Directive 80/987
70
 on the protection of employees in the event 
of the insolvency of their employer. This case appears to have triggered a series of other cases and has 
led to claims in Spain, France and Germany. However, there are more directives which have caused 
problems for the Member States. In particular, various claims were based on the Directives on 
working time and aspects relating to working time.
71
 Employees with irregular working hours, such as 
doctors, ambulance drivers and those in the fire services, have brought claims against the State in 
various Member States. Furthermore, a number of claims have been based on directives dealing with 
equal treatment in employment and social security.
72
 
What could be the possible reasons for the high amount of claims in employment law? One possible 
explanation could simply be that the directives in the field of employment and social security have 
been particularly difficult for Member States to implement. It could also be that the direct interference 
by the EU with national social legislation – which can definitely not be regarded as purely market-
facilitative – might have resulted in opposition at the national level and in an unwillingness to 
correctly implement the European directives. A second explanation could that these directives are one 
of the best examples of conferring individual rights to persons – in most cases employees. These 
employees use the possibility of State liability as a tool to enforce their rights in national courts. From 
that perspective, a link can be made to fundamental rights protection in the EU. Many directives in this 
field have a strong fundamental rights dimension – in particular those on equal treatment – and 
through the creation of Francovich State liability the CJEU has made a contribution to the 
enforcement of fundamental rights protection at the national level. This is reinforced by the recent 
emphasis of the CJEU on Article 47 of the Charter, which protects the right to effective judicial 
protection.
73
 
Another area in which Francovich claims have been quite prominent is the field of taxation and VAT. 
This is not very surprising – taxation is directly linked to national sovereignty and Member States have 
been resisting too much direct EU influence. Furthermore, many of the taxation cases – unlike the 
VAT cases – have been brought directly on the basis of the Treaty articles, such as the right to free 
movement of establishment or capital. Without a specification of the Member States’ obligations 
through the adoption of a directive, it has often been uncertain what exact obligations the Treaty 
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articles imposed on Member States. This means that the CJEU has had to play an important role in 
clarifying whether national legislation on taxation was in breach of the free movement provisions. As 
a result, national courts have been very reliant on the guidance from the CJEU and have been reluctant 
to find a sufficiently serious breach of EU law in the absence of a clear judgment of the CJEU.  
Conditions of liability 
A note of caution 
It might be argued that a too narrow focus on a specific condition of liability is apt to blur the 
plasticity with which the courts use to the conditions of liability to achieve their desired end. 
Nevertheless, by focusing on how national courts ‘interact’ with the conditions of liability invoked to 
deny or to infer liability tend to fit national orthodoxy as regards what is considered the important 
legal questions regarding attribution of legal responsibility to the state. 
To wit, in the UK and Germany the focus tends to be on the first two conditions of liability, namely, 
conferral of a right and the issue of sufficiently serious breach. These conditions might be thought to 
parallel the question of duty of care, and standard of care. Is there a legal bond between claimant and 
respondent, and what to what standard should the state be held accountable? 
For example, in the UK our analysis suggests that the interpretation of conferral of a right has been 
narrow to the extent that it might be thought to elide Francovich liability with the conditions required 
for direct effect.
74
 This might be considered to be a departure from EU law – although in this respect 
the CJEU has itself been less than clear as regards what conferral of a right involves, and the UK 
courts might be forgiven for this particular elision.
75
 Similarly, in Germany we can deduce from the 
Paul reference that the issue of the creation of a iuris vinculum is an important matter for the courts. It 
might explain the tendency of the courts only to frame the question of sufficiently serious breach as a 
matter of decided cases of the CJEU. In other words, even if a right is said to have been conferred, 
hence a prima facie ‘duty’ exists, the liability question at the sufficiently serious breach stage depends 
on a clear precedent judging that a violation of EU law has occurred. This implies that the courts are 
reluctant to tie a violation of rights to a remedy, which fits the general pattern of German State liability 
jurisprudence that is wary of inferring protected interests outside of clearly defined classes of 
relationships. 
In addition, it is a commonplace that in France the question of protected interest plays a secondary role 
as a control mechanism to that of causation. Therefore, it is not surprising that in France the analysis 
focuses more on the question of causation. What a direct causal link implies draws heavily on the 
existing interpretation of ‘causality’ in national law. To be sure, what a ‘direct causal link’ requires is 
the CJEU’s least-developed condition of liability and, once again, it is unsurprising that national courts 
have turned to its existing law to develop this condition. The extent to which this interpretation departs 
from an adequate interpretation of effectiveness, as distinct from equivalent, remains open, and we 
will do no more than point towards it in our conclusions. We simply note that traditionally in French 
law causation is the point at which control mechanisms are employed and not at the conferral of a right 
or standard of care stage, and it is telling, therefore, that in contrast to the UK courts, the most relevant 
discussion in France pertains to this condition of liability.
76
  
Leaving to one side the first and third conditions of liability, the introduction of the condition of a 
sufficiently serious breach has been the most innovative aspect of the State liability regime introduced 
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by the CJEU in Francovich. As a result, it can be said that this condition is the most autonomous 
condition for State liability under EU law. We propose to examine this condition in more detail than 
the other conditions of liability for the remainder of our conclusions. 
Sufficiently serious breach  
The logical consequence of its novelty is that this condition has also been the most difficult one for 
Member States to integrate in their national State liability regimes. It will be recalled that in Brasserie 
du Pecheur/Factortame the Court developed this condition of liability significantly pointing towards 
the factors that should be taken into account when deciding whether a breach is ‘sufficiently serious’ 
and stated that the breach must be ‘grave and manifest’. These factors were not intended to be 
exhaustive but nevertheless serve as guidelines for national courts to frame their enquiry. The English 
courts have referred to this ‘test’ as a ‘multifactorial’ one which is perhaps a good approximation for 
what was intended by the CJEU. The CJEU, in particular, stressed that the threshold of recovery 
varied with the extent of the discretion available to national authorities and, secondly, that the 
sufficiently serious criterion does not equate to negligence or mala fides.
77
 In other words, the 
condition is an autonomous European condition of liability. When examined in terms of the other 
remedial approaches available to a claimant (direct effect, Marleasing) Francovich appears as a 
remedy of last resort.
78
 This residual role for Francovich liability must, however, be balanced against 
the rights-protection dimension to the remedy – most recently stressed in AGM-Cos.met which 
indicated that recovery is not simply a hypothetical possibility, or, a type of recovery available only 
for the most egregious violations of the Treaty.
79
 In any event, the ‘multifactorial test’ means that 
considerable scope remains for national courts to shape Francovich liability according to the facts of 
the case with the guidance of the CJEU. 
With respect to the sufficiently serious breach condition, we claim that the difficulties in integrating 
Francovich liability into national law can be divided according to whether the Member State has a 
broad or narrow tradition of State liability. In those jurisdictions in which a broad pre-existing regime 
of liability exists the problem is one of equivalence of protection. In those jurisdictions in which 
threshold issues have stymied State liability claims or confined it to narrowly defined classes of 
individuals, the problem is one of effective protection. We examine, therefore, sufficiently serious 
breach under the rubric of equivalence and effectiveness of EU law. 
Effectiveness  
In the UK the courts have gradually developed the sufficiently serious breach test in a manner which 
emphasises the ‘intentionality’ or bad faith of the state as a precondition of recovery. The courts are 
deferential to the executive in areas in which the exercise of administrative discretion is required, and, 
as such, it appears particularly ‘egregious’ behaviour is required on behalf of the executive before 
recovery will be countenanced. In addition to unlawfulness per se, i.e. illegality, a requirement of 
culpability is required. It should be noted that this approach is broadly in line with the general 
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approach taken in respect of administrative action, which requires a degree of unlawfulness that can be 
described as unreasonableness meaning irrationality. In Barco, one of the few judgments in which a 
claimant succeeded, the motives of the respondent were questioned and the Court inferred that the 
administrative actions taken which interfered with the claimant’s Treaty freedoms (free movement of 
goods) was motivated by political expediency and not by a genuine attempt to protect animal welfare. 
In consequence, it could not be said that the acts rested on a rationally justifiable basis.  Other English 
judgments support the claim that the Court requires an element of bad faith as well.
80
 In a 
multifactorial test where the question of the use of discretionary powers is at issue, it might be argued 
that the arguments for or against recovery are finely balanced, and as such culpability plays a decisive 
role as distinct from forming a test in of itself. Notwithstanding this possibility, the pronouncements of 
the courts seem to suggest the bad faith element is an additional or supplementary condition of 
recovery imposed by the courts. In any event, the degree to which the culpability requirement above 
approximates fault can be debated. In fact, the requirement appears to be of a higher order because 
negligence at common law is judged according to an objective standard of care. The UK courts appear 
to require subjective fault, which is more stringent than ordinary negligence and more consistent with 
the general approach to the liability of public authorities which places policy mechanisms over-and-
above fault to limit recovery. 
In Ireland, it has been averred to that the ‘sufficiently serious’ requirement has not been treated in any 
great detail. The courts prefer to dismiss claims on the basis of causation, allowing for argument’s 
sake that the sufficiently serious breach criterion has been established. It is questionable, however, that 
this implies that sufficiently serious breach would in the event of a clear causal link be dealt with on 
its own terms or whether a type of refraction process would occur as described in our report on the 
UK.  
Equivalence 
In the civil law jurisdictions examined above, the question as to the treatment of sufficiently serious 
breach appear to devolve to one of what is referred to in the case-law and literature as a question of 
equivalent protection vis-à-vis national law. In particular, the questions arises what happens when the 
conditions for State liability under national law are more favourable to claimants than the Francovich 
conditions. For example, Spain has a State liability regime which is based on strict liability. This 
means that, in principle, the conditions for State liability under national law should be more easily 
satisfied than the conditions for Francovich State liability. It would not seem to be necessary to apply 
the Francovich conditions. In Germany, on the contrary, State liability under national law is only 
awarded if the State has been at fault – the breach of law must have been either intentional or 
negligent.
81
  
What happens when national State liability law is based on strict liability and should be more 
favourable to claimants than Francovich liability? Two different approaches can be identified in the 
reports. First of all, Spanish courts have consistently used the sufficiently serious breach condition to 
dismiss claims for State liability. In several cases Spanish courts held that the administration enjoyed a 
broad margin of discretion which meant that the breach of EU law was not sufficiently serious.
82
 
However, under national law the administration would not have enjoyed the same margin of discretion 
– the liability would have been strict in those cases. Therefore, it seems that Spanish courts are 
applying a more favourable standard to claims for State liability brought under national law than for 
claims brought under EU law. This is in breach of the principle of equivalence, since more favourable 
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criteria are applied to claims under national law. Interestingly, this means that the strict adherence of 
Spanish courts to the conditions for State liability which have been laid down by the CJEU could in 
itself constitute a breach of EU law.  
A different approach has been adopted in the Netherlands. However, it should immediately be 
emphasised that this approach was only adopted last year and has not yet been confirmed by the Dutch 
Supreme Court. For many years Dutch courts faithfully followed the conditions for State liability laid 
down in Francovich and Brasserie du Pecheur.
83
 However, last year the Court of Appeal of The 
Hague held that, under Dutch law, the adoption of legislation which was in breach of a superior law – 
including EU law – was sufficient for the State to be held liable to pay damages. As such, there was no 
requirement of a sufficiently serious breach under national law.
84
 The Court held that the conditions 
for Francovich State liability were only minimum conditions and that national law could go beyond 
the requirements imposed by EU law and could be more favourable to claimants. As a result, the 
Francovich conditions would now appear to have become obsolete in the Netherlands. It has become 
much easier for claimants to claim State liability for a breach of EU law. In principle, unlike the 
Spanish approach, this new Dutch approach appears consistent with the equivalence principle. 
However, it is not clear how broad its scope of application is.  
A more general problem is that before the ECJ’s judgment in Köbler85 many Member States did not 
provide for liability for acts of the judiciary. State liability has been extended to include such acts 
within the scope of State liability in order to comply with EU law. The question is then whether the 
equivalence principle still applies to this new type of State liability which did not exist under national 
law before Köbler. The simplest answer would be to say no, as there is no similar liability for acts of 
the judiciary under national law. At the same time, it is not clear whether for the purpose of the 
equivalence test national State liability law should be considered as a whole or whether a distinction 
between different types or heads of liability can be made. If this is permissible under EU law, the 
equivalence test would be satisfied because there would not be a similar claim under national law 
which was treated more favourably than a claim under EU law. 
Finally, it is clear that the German courts have applied the Francovich conditions for State liability. 
The result is that the conditions for State liability under EU law are more easily fulfilled than the 
conditions for State liability under national law, for which there is a fault requirement. As such, it 
could be said that EU law claims are treated more favourably than national law claims. One could 
expect the difference to encourage a general reform of German State liability law, but this has not 
taken place. As a result, Germany continues to have two separate regimes for State liability.  
Conclusion 
Our conclusions strike a cautious note. It is clear that the courts in each Member State have examined 
Francovich liability claims on their merits. The qualitative analysis indicates that State liability claims 
are reaching the courts, the merits and demerits of each claim questioned, if ultimately in most cases 
the claimant does not succeed in obtaining redress. Although the success rate – judged as the number 
of claimants which ultimately receive compensation – is low, it would be too hasty a judgment to 
suggest that this implies the remedy is merely hypothetical or of marginal importance. It can be 
argued, to the contrary, that the possibility of a liability claim incentivises compliance with EU law. 
One might therefore argue that judged as a deterrent Francovich is ‘working’. In addition, one might 
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argue that given the other remedies available to claimants short of state liability, the remedy is, and 
should only be, invoked in a residual manner – when cooperation between Member States and the EU 
breaks down. 
Nevertheless, a particularly pertinent finding of our research is that the substantive criteria of recovery 
take on a ‘life of their own’ once they are applied by national courts. National courts draw on their 
own national traditions of State liability to filter Francovich claims. This is particularly manifest when 
one considers how the UK courts deal with the application of the sufficiently serious breach criterion. 
It is evident, however, when one examines how Member States which traditionally have a more 
extensive form of recovery against the state interpret the conditions of liability, and, in particular, 
develop their law in light of which branch of government is the addressee of liability claims. 
Thus, the hybrid nature of the remedy does not equate in all circumstances to equivalent protection. 
This hybrid nature gives scope for national courts to interpret the conditions of liability, which are 
broad, and might be seen as minimum conditions, in light of national legal categories. If a violation is 
not ‘egregious’, a breach is not blatant, then the court is left with discretion as to whether liability 
should be imposed. The problem with this approach is that it can deviate from a correct interpretation 
of EU law. 
The State liability regime operates, in fact, if not in intention, as a framework of recovery which 
allows for significant diversity. This calls its autonomy into question. Whereas this might be 
considered preferable to a top-down liability regime, with more rigidly defined conditions of liability, 
it poses a problem when balancing the spirit of judicial cooperation in Article 10, which implies 
national legal (decentralized) enforcement, against the need for effective and equivalent rights-
protection.
86
 Our research indicates that the balance between judicial empowerment and uniform 
application of law does not always yield an optimal outcome. When applied by national courts the 
danger is that the conditions of liability become refracted to the detriment of rights protection. This is 
particularly the case in circumstances where courts are reluctant to refer cases to the CJEU on the 
basis of the preliminary reference procedure. From our preliminary investigations, it would appear 
drawing on Greene’s metaphor once more that old and new wines flow together. The application of 
Francovich liability would appear to alter its substance. The degree to which this is acceptable in a 
legal order based on the principle of primacy is debatable. One thing, however, is certain. The national 
courts contribute to the shaping of Francovich liability and do not simply apply the law developed at 
the European level.  
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